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Explaining Informal Taxation and Revenue Generation: Evidence from 
south-central Somalia 
Vanessa van den Boogaard and Fabrizio Santoro 
Summary 
Most people in low-income countries contribute substantially to the financing of local public 
goods through informal revenue generation (IRG). However, very little is known about how 
IRG works in practice. We produce novel evidence on the magnitude and regressivity of IRG 
and its relationship with the state in a fragile context, Somalia. We rely on original data from 
surveys with over 2,300 households and 117 community leaders in Gedo region, as well as 
on extensive qualitative research. 
We first show that IRG is prevalent. Over 70 per cent of households report paying at least 
one informal tax or fee in the previous year, representing on average 9.5 per cent of annual 
income. We also find that, among households that contribute, poorer ones contribute larger 
amounts than richer ones, with higher incidence in relation to their income. Further, in line 
with theory and expectations, informal payments have inequitable community-level effects, 
with individuals in wealthier communities making more informal payments than in poorer 
ones and, correspondingly, having access to a greater number of public goods.  
We then consider four explanations for the prevalence of IRG. First, IRG clearly fills gaps left 
by weak state capacity. Relatedly, we show that IRG can bolster perceptions and legitimacy 
of the state, indicating that sub-national governments may actually benefit from informal 
taxation. Second, informal taxing authorities are more effective tax collectors than the state, 
with informal taxing authorities having greater legitimacy and taxpayers perceiving informal 
payments to be fairer than those levied by the state. Third, dispelling the possibility that 
informal payments should be classified as user fees, taxpayers overwhelmingly expect 
nothing in return for their contributions. Fourth, in contrast to hypotheses that informal 
payments may be voluntary, taxpayers associate informal payments with punishment and 
informal institutions of enforcement.  
Our research reinforces the importance of IRG to public goods provision in weak formal 
institutional contexts, to everyday citizens, and to policymakers attempting to extend the 
influence of the federal state in south-central Somalia. Foremost, informal tax institutions 
need to be incorporated within analyses of taxation, service delivery, social protection, and 
equity. At the same time, our findings of the complementary nature of IRG and district-level 
governance and of the relative efficiency of revenue generation by local leaders have 
important implications for understanding statebuilding processes from below. Indeed, our 
findings suggest that governments may have little incentive to extend their taxing authority in 
some fragile contexts.  
Keywords: informal taxation, informal revenue generation, equity, public goods provision, 
Somalia. 
Vanessa van den Boogaard is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Tax and 
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Introduction 
Individuals in low-income countries pay little in formal direct taxes, including on income and 
property (Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad 2018; van den Boogaard 2018). This is particularly 
true in Somalia, which, with a tax to GDP ratio of little over 2 per cent of GDP, has the 
weakest tax capacity in the world (ICTD/UNU-WIDER 2020; World Bank 2019). 
Nevertheless, there is growing recognition that most people in low-income countries 
contribute substantially to the financing of local public goods through informal taxation and 
revenue generation (see Lust and Rakner 2018; Olken and Singhal 2011; Prud’homme 1992; 
van den Boogaard, Prichard and Jibao 2019; van den Boogaard and Prichard 2016). Despite 
this growing recognition, there remains limited understanding of how local public goods 
financing works in practice and limited empirical evidence across diverse contexts.  
Through a detailed exploration of informal taxation and revenue generation in Gedo region in 
south-central Somalia, we contribute novel evidence to a growing body of literature in this 
field (e.g. Paler, Prichard, Sanchez de la Sierra and Samii 2017; Titeca and Kimanuka 2012; 
van den Boogaard 2020; Walker 2017). First, we provide rich empirical data on informal 
public goods financing in an understudied case. Though much has been written about the 
nature of non-state service delivery and welfare provision in the context of the ‘collapse’ of 
the Somali state in 1991, the role and implications of citizens in contributing to the funding of 
these public goods through informal tax and fee payment is often overlooked. We draw 
attention to the underappreciated ways that Somalis contribute to and bear the burden of 
public goods provision in the absence of a centralised, redistributive tax system. Second, by 
relying on both rich empirical data on informal taxes, fees, and contributions from surveys of 
over 2,300 households and 117 community leaders as well as deep contextual knowledge of 
the processes and grounding of informal payments, we offer an expansive view of the nature 
and significance of informal revenue raising, as well as its relations to local institutions and 
the state. We capture both informal and formal payments, as well as contributions to and 
perceptions of multiple actors. This allows for a more nuanced exploration of the effects of 
different types of informal taxes and their situation within a broader fiscal–political context 
compared to studies that consider informal taxation alone. Alongside this empirical evidence, 
we provide an in-depth look at the complex nature of informal revenue raising institutions and 
the multitude of actors involved.   
In our analysis, we define informal revenue generation as non-market payments that are not 
required or defined by state law and are enforced outside of the state legal system (van den 
Boogaard 2020).1 According to this definition, informal state or non-state actors may levy 
taxes – what matters is whether the taxes have a formal legal basis and reach the formal 
public budget.2 Informal revenue generation serves as an umbrella concept that captures a 
range of different informal payments: some that look more like user fees to access specific 
services, some that look more like taxes to collectively finance public goods, some that 
finance informal governance institutions and systems of social welfare, some that are defined 
by state law but whose revenues don’t reach state coffers, and some that may look more like 
protection payments or extortion for the provision of security, with little choice of whether to 
pay or not. 3 Rather than trying to strictly categorise payments as such, we recognise that 
1 This is in line with the definition of Prud’homme (1992: 6), who defines informal taxation as ‘nonformal means utilised to 
finance the provision of public goods’, and is broader than the definition used by Olken and Singhal (2011: 5), who 
capture only contributions to the collective construction of community works. In line with the political science literature, 
we define local public goods as goods that are geographically targeted and confer benefits on multiple community 
members, rather than the stricter economic definition (see e.g. Tiebout 1956). Examples include public schools and 
water wells. 
2 We specify enforcement as ‘outside of the state legal system’ in order to contrast with enforcement through social and 
informal institutions.  
3 In defining informal payments as being enforced outside of the state, we are less concerned with the inherently blurred 
lines between their voluntary or compulsory nature – which is complicated in contexts, as in Gedo region, where social 
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‘the provision of any public good likely involves some combination of these types of 
payments, while also often involving multiple taxing actors, which themselves may not 
always be easily categorised as “state” or “non-state”’ (van den Boogaard 2020: 54). We 
value a broad conceptualisation in order to better understand the real costs for taxpayers to 
access public goods and services in contexts of weak formal systems of tax and 
redistribution, though likewise see value in disaggregating informal revenue generation in our 
analysis in recognition of the diversity of payments captured within.  
Fundamentally, our evidence makes clear that informal revenue generation in Gedo region is 
both prevalent, deeply embedded within clan-based and Islamic institutions, and also rooted 
in a long history of decentralised political authority and self-reliance in the region – as 
described in Sections 2 and 3. We present several stylised facts about informal revenue 
generation. First, it is prevalent, with over 70 per cent of respondents reporting having paid at 
least one informal tax or fee in the previous year. Second, informal payments represent a 
significant share of annual income for households (on average 9.5 per cent among 
households that make any informal payment), with incidence in cash higher than through 
labour. Third, we find that informal payments are not regressive at the extensive margin, as 
more vulnerable populations contribute less, but are regressive at the intensive margin 
among households that make any payments. Among households that contribute, we find that 
poorer ones contribute larger amounts than richer ones. Correspondingly, the incidence of 
such amounts over income is higher in poorer than richer households. At the same time, 
reliance on informal payments implies inequitable community-level effects, with individuals in 
wealthier communities making more informal payments than in poorer ones. 
Building on the seminal work of Olken and Singhal (2011), we move beyond these stylised 
facts to further explore non-mutually exclusive explanations for the prevalence of informal 
revenue raising in this context. Four key findings emerge. First, informal payments clearly fill 
gaps left by weak state capacity. We argue, however, that the Somali government lacks not 
just the capacity but also the will to strengthen direct taxation, given in part its reliance on the 
business community and clans to govern and to maintain peace and stability. Further, we 
present novel evidence that sub-national governments may actually benefit from the 
outcomes enabled by informal payments, with payment of informal taxes positively correlated 
with district-level tax morale, thus suggesting that local governments may have little incentive 
to extend their taxing capacity and authority or control informal taxes. On the one hand, this 
finding, indicating that informal taxes may actually increase the state’s capacity to collect 
formal taxes and strengthen state legitimacy through tax morale, is theoretically surprising 
given the tendency to assume that informality undermines state institutions (e.g. Böröcz 
2000; Lauth 2000). However, it is consistent with more recent and nuanced understandings 
of informality that show informal institutions do not necessarily exist in a zero-sum 
relationship with formal ones (see e.g. Cleaver 2001; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Lund 2006; 
Meagher 1990, 2007, 2012), and supported by recent evidence that informal taxing actors 
may reinforce state authority and strengthen the state’s capacity to govern (Roitman 2005; 
Titeca and De Herdt 2011; van den Boogaard 2020). Second, the decentralised nature of 
informal taxing authority is more effective than the state at both gathering the information 
necessary for revenue raising and enforcing payment, as well as in encouraging quasi-
voluntary tax compliance, with relatively high taxpayer perceptions of the fairness of informal 
payments. This finding is in line with research from Sierra Leone that shows that taxpayers 
have more positive perceptions of informal taxes than formal taxes (van den Boogaard et al. 
 
pressures and intragroup reliance for survival are high – than we are with capturing the experience and perspectives of 
taxpayers themselves. While we thus do not capture entirely voluntary contributions, including donations through 
sadaqah (an Islamic voluntary charitable contribution collected through mosques and nationwide networks), we capture 
a range of informal payments that may be more or less mandatory in different spatial and temporal contexts. For a 
deeper discussion of the complicated nature of the concept of informal revenue generation – particularly with regard to 
its relationship to state law and public goods provision; the blurred lines between taxation, corruption, and extortion; and 
the spectrum of voluntarism versus obligation – see van den Boogaard (2020: 51-65).  
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2019), as well as broader evidence that citizens have greater trust in more localised authority 
(e.g. Bratton 2010). Third, while some forms of informal revenue generation can be classified 
as user fees, linked directly to service provision, taxpayers overwhelming indicate that they 
expect nothing in return for the most common forms of informal payments. Finally, despite 
there being an undeniably blurry relationship between the voluntary and compulsory nature 
of many types of informal payments that rely on social enforcement, taxpayers 
overwhelmingly viewed informal payments as being associated with forms of punishment.  
We develop these arguments in the following six sections. The first section outlines the 
research design and summarises the data upon which we rely. In Section 2 we provide 
background on the nature of state taxation in south-central Somalia, illustrating how effective 
direct taxation under a centralised authority has long been a persistent challenge, leading to 
a context today wherein the central government effectively does not collect taxes outside of 
Mogadishu, while the sub-national tax system is fragmented and lacks grounding in a 
framework of fiscal federalism. With the context thus set, in Section 3, we provide a detailed 
descriptive view into the nature of community-based informal revenue raising in Gedo region, 
demonstrating how it is essential to the collective obligations shaped by clan governance 
institutions and customary law, the provision of security in fragile contexts, and the provision 
of both social welfare and local public goods. Building on this conceptual understanding of 
informal revenue raising, in Section 4 we present stylised facts with respect to the magnitude 
and distribution of informal taxation and revenue generation in this context. Section 5 
proceeds to test non-mutually exclusive hypotheses for explaining the prevalence of informal 
taxation in the region. Section 6 concludes by considering the implications of our findings and 
highlighting key questions for future research.  
 
 
1  Research design and data 
 
In line with our central objective of contributing to the empirical basis of knowledge around 
informal taxation, we explore the phenomenon in the understudied context of south-central 
Somalia, representing an ‘unusually revelatory’ case for the study of informal taxation 
(Eisenhardt and Graeber 2007: 27). Existing data on informal revenue generation (IRG) 
indicates that it may be more prevalent where state institutional capacity is weak, public 
services are insufficiently provided by the state, conflict has affected the legitimacy of the 
state, and actors outside of the state have taxing authority (van den Boogaard 2020). Across 
these four indicators, Somalia represents an extreme case, making it an ideal context within 
which to explore the nature of informal taxation and revenue generation.  
 
This study is the result of two distinct phases of data collection in the region. First, in 2016, 
one of the authors led qualitative data collection in seven case studies in Hirshabelle and 
Jubbaland states, representing a mix of rural and urban locations.4 For this qualitative 
scoping study of the context of informal taxation in south-central Somalia, interviews were 
delegated to Somali-speaking research assistants with secure access to case study regions.5 
Over 40 focus group discussions were held with, separately, taxpayers; women; clan or 
traditional leaders; business people, traders, and/ or market leaders; and civil society 
 
4  In Hirshabelle state, data was collected in Beledweyne, El Gal, Matabaan, and Buuloburde. In Jubbaland state, data 
was collected in Kismayo, Dooloow, and Beled Xaawo. 
5 Research enumerators followed structured interview and focus group discussion guides, as well as completing summary 
briefs after each interview and focus group discussion in order to record reflections about the data. While working with 
local research assistants facilitated access and ensured greater security for research teams and participants, delegating 
data collection comes with additional challenges (see e.g. Cammett 2013). Accordingly, during data collection we held 
frequent meetings with research teams and reviewed data daily to ensure data quality. Data security and guarantees of 
anonymity were central to the research process. Accordingly, when citing interviews, we do not identify sub-state 
locations and provide no other identifying information. More information about this study and a highlight of key findings 
is published as Jordan (2016). For interview and focus group discussion questionnaires, see the online appendix.   
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leaders, including youth groups. Additionally, 72 interviews were conducted with local 
government finance officials, council members and chairpeople, mayors, district 
commissioners, representatives from local government tax departments, tax collectors, 
traditional, religious and clan leaders, civil society representatives, and taxpayers. 
 
Building on this qualitative scoping study, in 2018, we engaged in quantitative data collection 
in Dooloow, Luuq, and Beled Xaawo districts of Gedo region, situated in Jubbaland state in 
south-central Somalia (see Appendix 1). Relative to northern Somalia, south-central Somalia 
represents a useful context in which to study informal revenue generation as a result of the 
legacy of its long history of decentralised governance, severe experience of civil conflict after 
the fall of the state in 1991,6 longstanding presence of Islamist groups,7 and evidence of 
community-based self-reliance, taxation and hybrid governance (see e.g. Gundel 2006; 
Menkhaus 2004a: 27, 2006: 86).8 Within the administrative region of Gedo, we used a 
stratified sub-district sampling frame, purposively selecting 128 settlements in Gedo region 
on the basis of their voluntary engagement to be included for consideration within a matching 
grant and cash transfer programme funded by the Somalia Stability Fund and implemented 
by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).9 Descriptive data about settlements is included in 
Appendix 2.10   
 
There are two potential limitations to how representative these settlements are of the broader 
population in south-central Somalia. First, in order to be eligible for consideration in the DRC 
programme, settlements had to be secure enough to allow for DRC field staff to visit at the 
time of data collection (March 2018) and thus may not be comparable to less secure ones. 
Though selected settlements include multiple clans, they are primarily dominated by the 
Marehan (see Appendix 2), with such clan dominance often being an indicator of stability and 
cohesion. While selected settlements may thus be relatively secure, there is good reason to 
think that they do not differ significantly from other settlements in Gedo region, given the 
broader dominance of the Marehan in the region (see Appendix 3; Appendix 4). 
Nevertheless, the institutions of local governance and revenue raising that we map in Gedo 
region may not be representative of other areas of south-central Somalia that are less secure 
and/or dominated by other clan families.11 Despite the potentially unique context of Gedo 
 
6 The civil war that broke out in the 1990s was centred in southern Somalia, while even after the Transitional Federal 
Government was established in 2004, south-central Somalia continued to face instability and more complex conflict 
rooted in clan-based political factional rivalry, warlordism, and Islamic-based factionalism (Gundel 2006).  
7 During the civil war, Jubbaland had a significant presence of Islamist militants, including al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which 
rose to power in the region in the 1990s and was headquartered in Luuq district. By 2007, Harakat al-Shabaab al-
Mujahideen (al-Shabaab), the erstwhile youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union, seized control over towns in Jubbaland 
state and much of south-central Somalia. Even after Jubbaland was incorporated into the Federal Government of 
Somalia in 2013, al-Shabaab has continued to exercise control in large parts of the rural areas of the state and in most 
of the rural areas and roads between districts in Gedo region, as well as territory in the southeast of the district (Hansen 
2016; Hiraal Institute 2020b; UN Habitat 2018: 5,6). As noted by the Hiraal Institute (2020b), al-Shabaab’s ‘main focus 
among the federal member states is Jubbaland, where it increased its attacks [in 2020]’. See Appendix 4. 
8 By contrast, with the fall of the central state in 1991, in the north, two former militia factions quickly established political 
control over substantial territories, creating the self-declared autonomous state of Somaliland in 1991 and the 
autonomous regional administration of Puntland in 1998, with both considered ‘de facto states’ (Johnson and Smaker 
2014), offering ‘lessons in successful Somali governance’ (Hesse 2010a). Somaliland been widely seen as ‘an oasis of 
(relatively) good governance’ (Hesse 2010b: 350; see also Eubank 2012; Le Sage 2005; Walls 2009), and described as 
a ‘state-within-a-failed-state’ (Bryden 2004), while Puntland was the only part of Somalia unaffected by the civil war, 
enabling it to create ‘a viable regional administration authority’ (Menkhaus 1998: 221).  
9 Data in this paper served as baseline for an evaluation of this programme, more information about which is available in 
van den Boogaard and Santoro (forthcoming).  
10 We define settlement in line with the UNFPA (2014: 118) as ‘A group of dwellings comprising different households in a 
delineated area with clear boundaries.’ Most of these are rural villages (tuulo/bulsho), though our sample also includes 
the three district headquarter towns of Luuq, Dooloow, and Beled Xaawo. While the population of internally displaced 
people (IDPs) in Gedo region is relatively high (estimated to be 15 per cent relative to 9 per cent across the country) 
(UNFPA 2014), our sample excludes IDP camps.  
11  Overall, despite the continued presence of al-Shabaab, Gedo is perceived to be safer than other regions in Jubbaland 
state on account of political and economic power being centralised in the hands of an important clan, the Marehan 
(Menkhaus 2006: 84), having a more homogenous population, and having a significant Ethiopian military presence (UN 
Habitat 2018: 22). This concentration of power comes at the expense of minority clans including the Raxanweyn and 
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region, as there is no established theory on the relationship between informal taxation and 
insecurity,12 there is no a priori reason to think that our estimations of informal tax are 
systematically over or underestimated.  
 
Second, as villages in our sample opted to be considered for the DRC’s matching grant 
programme, which required communities to raise revenues locally, they may be more likely 
to have a stronger ability to mobilise informal revenues than communities that did not opt in. 
This possibility is made more likely by the reality that the majority clan in the region 
dominated most of the settlements. Nevertheless, our previous experience studying informal 
taxation and revenue generation outside of Gedo region, including elsewhere in Jubbaland 
and Hirshabelle states, give us confidence that the nature and prevalence of informal 
revenue generation that we describe, if not the exact institutional configurations, reflects 
broader patterns of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-help’ in the south-central region. While the nature 
of informal revenue collection and social welfare provision are expected to differ based on 
clan family and region, we are confident that informal revenue generation and public goods 
provision is more broadly significant in the region. 
 
Our primary source of data is an original household survey capturing formal and informal tax 
incidence, public goods usage, perceptions of state and non-state actors and taxation, and 
civic and political participation.13 Enumerators conducted surveys with 1,297 randomly 
selected households (‘general group’) and an additional 1,037 vulnerable households that 
were randomly selected from a population identified by community leaders as vulnerable 
(‘vulnerable group’).14 Vulnerability in the latter group is demonstrated in the higher 
distribution of female respondents,15 lower levels of education, and lower incomes 
(demonstrated through a poverty index (‘wealth index (PCA)’), joblessness and lack of land 
ownership), while those in this group simultaneously have less access to assistance, 
 
does not imply that there is a lack of intraclan conflict. For example, within the Marehan there is a split between original 
habitants (guri) and new settlers (galti), with common conflicts over power and resources.  
12  On the one hand, more insecure regions may rely on informal taxation to a greater extent, given more limited ability for 
state and humanitarian actors to provide local services and given greater need for local actors to provide security. On 
the other hand, more insecure regions may be more divided, with local leaders less able to levy informal taxes.  
13 Ethics and security protocols were strictly followed in line with ICTD research protocols and the security guidelines of 
the DRC. Given the conflict-affected context, there were considerable ethical and security considerations related to 
conducting fieldwork (see e.g. Peritore 1990; E. J. Wood 2006). The security team at the DRC was essential for 
ensuring that the fieldwork was conducted safely and ethically. As described, case selection was shaped by the relative 
security of settlements. The security team provided daily security status reports, with teams of enumerators moving only 
with the permission of the security team, who approved areas for research and monitored the situation on the ground. At 
the same time, enumerators and field supervisors were critical in interpreting complex cultural contexts and monitoring 
potential threats of violence. Their embeddedness in local communities (with enumerators selected from each of the 
three case study districts) ensured access to security-related information through trust-based relationships. Several 
further precautions were taken to ensure the security of both the research team and participants. In particular, the 
survey does not ask questions that could be perceived to be overly political or related to ongoing statebuilding 
processes. Accordingly, we ask questions about the government at the district level, but not more broadly. At the same 
time, we do not ask questions directly about informal payments made to or relations with militias and armed groups. In 
every situation, we only engaged with research participants after acquiring informed consent and ensuring that we were 
able to provide credible guarantees that the research would not cause harm to the research participants. Data security 
and guarantees of anonymity were central to the research process. Further, gender dynamics were particularly 
important to consider in the context for both the safety of research enumerators and the validity of data (for further 
discussion see e.g. Arendell 1997; Jackson and Kelly 2019). Enumerators included both men and women, though field 
research supervisors in each district were male in order to facilitate the movement of research teams. Having a gender-
balanced team was important to ensure the participation of women in the surveys, interviews, and focus group 
discussions, with female enumerators often having greater access to female-headed households. For further reflections 
on the gender dynamics and the relevant challenges, opportunities, and ethical dilemmas in data collection in a different 
context, see van den Boogaard (2019). 
14 Community leaders identified these households as vulnerable in order to be eligible for cash transfers through the DRC 
programme described above.  
15 Women are marginalised from clan decision-making, which is led by male clan elders on the basis of consensus (J. 
Gardner and Bushra 2004; Gundel 2006: iv). Despite the patriarchal system and limited income earning potential of 
women, they are, according to the PDRC (2019: 1), ‘the primary providers, breadwinners and the backbones of many 
households’, in part as a result of conflict-related household disruptions (see also J. Gardner and Bushra 2004; UNFPA 
2016). At the same time, women have long been central to community-based public goods provision and have often 
been responsible for paying for informal user fees and taxes, particularly where they relate to education and health care 
(PDRC 2019; see also Joshi, Kangave and van den Boogaard 2020).  
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potentially related to their greater social marginalisation and lower rates of civic engagement, 
including participation in organised religious, social, political or trade groups (Table 1). 
Capturing data from both samples gives a more complete picture of outcomes in this context, 
in particular allowing us to more systematically explore regressivity across the general 
population, as well as within lower income and female-dominated sub-populations.  
 
Table 1 Summary statistics of general and vulnerable groups16 
 
 
Settlement-level data complements household-level data. Enumerators conducted surveys 
with 117 community leaders, including clan elders and leaders of village committees, 
capturing settlement-level data on public services, self-help activities, political and civic 
decision-making, community groups, civic participation, the nature of formal and informal 
taxation, security, and information about community development projects. Providing 
additional empirical richness, we rely on directly observable data about the settlements 
collected by enumerators, including the quantity and quality of public services and indicators 




16 All variables in Table 1 are indicator variables that take value 0 or 1. The only exception is the wealth index, built from 
principal component analysis (PCA). PCA delivers the combination of housing indicators which retain the highest 
variance in the sample, or first component. The indicators used to build the index are the following: whether the 
household has a mobile phone, whether the house is owned with a formal land title, whether the house has roof, walls, 
floor, the number of rooms in the house, and whether the respondent has a job. 
17 Questionnaire forms are available in the online appendix to this paper. 
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2  State taxation in south-central Somalia 
 
Effective direct taxation under a centralised authority has been a persistent challenge in 
south-central Somalia. Before the colonisation and partition of the territory occupied by ethnic 
Somalis by Ethiopia, Britain, Italy and France, there was no centralised Somali state, with it 
largely only being ‘on the coast that any degree of centralised government was established 
and maintained’ (Lewis 2002: 33). As nomadic pastoralists, much of the population did not 
fall under a state-like authority, but rather was politically decentralised, representing ‘a 
nation, not a state’ (Lewis 1993: 25; see also Laitin and Samatar 1987).18 With colonial 
intervention and the establishment of British and Italian Somaliland in the late nineteenth 
century, tax capacity remained weak. Colonial authorities were unable or unwilling to institute 
an effective system of direct taxation, relying primarily on indirect taxes and customs duties 
(Kakwenzire 1986: 669; Lewis 2002: 104; Abdi Ismail Samatar 1989: 86; S. S. Samatar 
2009: 104), in part because of fierce resistance to colonial authority and taxation in particular 
(Issa-Salwe 1996; Geshekter 1985; Hess 1966; Kakwenzire 1986; Mohamoud 2006; Abdi 
Ismail Samatar 1989; Tripodi 1999: 65; Turton 1969, 1972).19  
 
The state’s reliance on indirect taxation persisted after the unification of Italian and British 
Somaliland and the independence of the Somali Republic in 1960 (Medani 2003: 200), with 
domestic revenues often insufficient to fund government activities. In part due to the 
‘structural defects of the taxes and… the inefficient operation and administrative weaknesses 
of the tax system’ (Purohit 1990: 188; see also Mohamud and Isak 2019; Mubarak 1996), the 
authoritarian regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre (1969–1990) relied on a high proportion of 
‘Cold War-generated’ international aid, rather than taxes (Menkhaus 2006; Abdi Ismail 
Samatar 1988; Varming 2019). Even as tax revenues increased throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, they were predominately made up of customs taxes, while contributing little to state 
expenditure (Purohit 1990),20 with the state having limited reach or presence outside of 
Mogadishu.21 Following the disastrous Ogaden War with Ethiopia from 1977–1978, the 
economic mismanagement and repression of the Barre regime intensified (Menkhaus 2006; 
Omar 1992). With the freezing of aid by Western donors in 1988–89, the central government 
was ‘left virtually devoid of resources’ (Menkhaus 2006: 80), collapsing in January 1991. 
During the subsequent period of statelessness, there was no official, centralised tax system 
(Mohamud and Isak 2019; Webersik 2004: 91, 150–154, 172, 179–180).22  
Various attempts at peace and statebuilding were attempted between 2000 and 2011, 
though as their authority was transitional and limited, attempts to re-introduce taxes and 
customs duties were largely ineffective (Isak 2018; Mohamud and Isak 2019). Even after the 
establishment of the internationally recognised Federal Government of Somalia in 2012 – the 
first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war – the central 
state and its taxing capacity remain weak. This is unsurprising given that the central 
government has limited power outside of Mogadishu.23 At the same time, the presence of 
 
18 The exceptions to this political decentralisation were the city-states and sultanates of the Middle Ages and early modern 
period. Some of these, including Adal in the north and Ajuran and Geledi in the south, extended considerable reach 
beyond the coast (including in Jubbaland) and collected tribute from cultivators in the form of agricultural goods and 
from nomads in the form of livestock (see e.g. Cassanelli 1982; Jalata 2004; Njoku 2013). 
19 Abdi Ismail Samatar (1989: 86) shows that ‘in the case of the Italian colony indirect taxes constituted about 73 per cent 
of the state’s locally generated revenues between 1950 and 1958… In the British Protectorate indirect taxes, mainly in 
the form of customs duties, accounted for more than 80 per cent of the local revenues from 1955 to 1959’. 
20 Menkhaus and Ortmayer (1999: 4) describe that ‘By the mid-1980s, 100% of Somalia’s development budget was 
externally funded, and 50% of its recurrent budget was dependent on international loans and grants.’ 
21 Indeed, Barre was jokingly referred to by Somalis as the ‘Mayor of Mogadishu’ (Spears 2004: 19–20). 
22 During this period, Menkhaus (2004c: 51) described Somalia as ‘the largest duty-free shop in the world’.  
23 As described above, precolonial authority was relatively decentralised, and colonial institutions did nothing to strengthen 
the reach of the central administration, while during the period of state collapse, ‘real political power’ became ‘radically 
decentralised’ (Menkhaus 1998: 224; see also Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995). 
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armed groups with parallel governing and taxing structures limits the state’s capacity to 
extend its reach outside of the capital region. Most consequentially, al-Shabaab runs a 
‘shadow government’, including a highly efficient and centralised taxation system that is 
applied consistently across southern and central Somalia (Bryden 2014; Hansen 2016; Hiraal 
Institute 2018, 2020a; Joseph and Maruf 2018; United Nations Security Council 2018).24  
These factors have led to a situation wherein the federal government only collects revenue 
from the Benaadir (capital) region in practice, with formal central state taxation non-existent 
outside of Mogadishu and key ports of entry (Mohamud and Isak 2019: 126; United Nations 
Security Council 2018; World Bank 2015). Annual federal tax revenues are estimated at on 
average little over 2 per cent of GDP between 2013 and 2018, the only years for which data 
is available (Figure 1) – or about half of what al-Shabaab is estimated to take in in revenues 
each year (Hiraal Institute 2020a).25 An even better indicator of state capacity is direct 
taxation to GDP, given that it is more difficult to collect taxes on income or wealth than it is to 
collect indirect taxes on sales and international trade (e.g. Fukuyama 2013: 353). On this 
indicator, Somali formal tax capacity performs even worse, with total taxes on income and 
profit amounting to on average only 0.09 per cent of GDP over the same period, with the 
state almost entirely dependent on international trade taxes (Figure 1; see also United 
Nations Security Council 2018; World Bank 2015, 2017).  
 
24 While not the only armed group that is involved in tax collection in Somalia – notably, the Islamic State has been 
growing in strength in Somali territory since 2015 – al-Shabaab remains the largest and most sophisticated. Its taxing 
capacity extends beyond its areas of territorial control – even spreading into the capital, Mogadishu, the only city that 
the government has reliably controlled – and is broader, more effective, and more systematic than that of the federal 
government (Faruk and Bearak 2019; Hiraal Institute 2018; Maruf 2018; United Nations Security Council 2018: par. 86). 
Notably, it is significantly more effective at directly taxing income than the central government, while being the only 
Somali polity to have substantial money reserves (Hiraal Institute 2020a). 
25 While domestic revenue has increased considerably in recent years as a result of a range of tax policy and 
administrative reforms (see e.g. Mohamud and Isak 2019), Somalia still has the lowest domestic revenue to GDP ratio 
in the world. Even while the Federal Government of Somalia argues that it’s not fair to compare Mogadishu-based 
revenue with the national GDP, Mohamud and Isak (2019), researchers within the Ministry of Finance, estimate that a 
comparison with consolidated fiscal data would only put the revenue ratio at over 2.5 per cent.  
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Figure 1 State tax capacity 
 
Data source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020); World Bank (2019).26 
 
Meanwhile, the sub-national tax system is fragmented, with ‘multiple and layered public 
administrations’ collecting taxes (Musa, Stepputat and Hagmann 2020: 2; see also Hagmann 
and Hoehne 2009), representing an ‘extreme case’ of multiple taxation (Raballand and 
Knebelmann 2020: 23).27 Federalisation is incomplete, with no clear framework for fiscal 
federalism (Federal Government of Somalia 2016: vii). While the ongoing federalising 
process outlines an agreement wherein the federal member states (FMS) and the Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS) share the responsibility of delivering services to citizens 
(Federal Republic of Somalia 2012), policies around power sharing are ambiguous, 
especially in relation to tax assignments among the governments and intragovernmental 
transfer policies (Isak 2018), with negotiations ongoing between the FGS and FMS.28 With 
this ambiguity, federal member states collect taxes in their jurisdictions without central 
oversight or clarity on tax assignments, with revenue collection processes ‘still in the making’ 
(Musa et al. 2020: 7). Unsurprisingly, performance of sub-national entities is highly variable, 
with Jubbaland state among the worst revenue performers, with per capita taxation 
amounting to just US$6.2 in 2018 (Raballand and Knebelmann 2020: 11).  
 
26 Somalia tax and revenue data are sourced from World Bank (2019), while the low-income country average over the 
same period is sourced from ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2020). Note that total revenue excludes external grants, which 
represented on average 1.6 per cent of GDP from 2013 to 2018 (World Bank 2019). 
27 This reflects the patchwork nature of statebuilding after the civil war, when the lack of central state authority led to a 
situation wherein ‘whoever had territorial control and defended it became a de facto state’ (Musa et al. 2020: 6; see also 
Hoehne 2009).   
28 For example, the Provisional Constitution assigns revenue-raising responsibilities to the level of government that can 
exercise that responsibility most effectively (Federal Republic of Somalia 2012: Art. 50(f)), to be determined by 
negotiation. While there have been some preliminary agreements on revenue sharing of natural resource revenue and 
harmonisation of some tax rates, these agreements lack legal standing, highlighting that the transition to the federal 
system and process of decentralisation has been incomplete and lacking in clarity (Isak 2018). 
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Figure 2 Estimated revenues for the FGS, FMS, and Somaliland (2018)29 
 
Data source: Raballand and Knebelmann (2020). 
 
 
Figure 3 Breakdown of revenues for the FGS, FMS, and Somaliland (2018) 
 
 
Data source: Raballand and Knebelmann (2020). 
 
Meanwhile, municipalities and districts levy taxes through uncoordinated and often 
overlapping revenue collection systems of various forms, many of which arose during the 
period of state collapse in the 1990s. They have limited capacity to collect revenue, with a 
heavy emphasis on business, transport, and livestock taxes, the latter of which have long 
been a main source of tax revenue for local administrations throughout the country (Mukhtar 
2003: 138; see also Musa et al. 2020: 12). Even in federal member states with stronger 
administrative capacity, tax collection remains limited and unable to finance basic public 
services. For example, though located in the strongest performing federal member state, 
municipalities in Puntland raise enough revenue only to cover salaries and administrative 
costs, but little more, with more than 70 per cent of expenditure earmarked for recurrent 
administrative costs (Salah 2014: 14).  
 
29 Per capita revenues are based on estimated population figures, which are disputed among some of the FMS. 
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Taxpayer data reflects the limited reach of both the national and sub-national governments in 
Gedo region. Only 17 per cent of households and 13 per cent of vulnerable households 
reported paying any formal tax, and in most cases, this was only a livestock tax paid at the 
local level (Isak 2018).30 Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the often blurred lines 
between formal and informal taxation in the context of Somalia, where ‘even official state 
taxes may in some ways be considered informal, while informal payments are sometimes 
considered [formal] taxation’ (Varming 2019: 4; see also Hiraal Institute 2020a).31 While in 
the survey we do not ask to whom formal taxes are paid, there is evidence that suggests that 
livestock taxes may be paid to a variety of state and non-state actors (Musa et al. 2020) – 
implying that they may be informal (e.g. they do not end up in state coffers, regardless of to 
whom they are paid) and that the tax compliance figures in Figure 4 may thus overestimate 
formal state taxes.32 




In this context, it is unsurprising that tax collectors across the country describe reluctance 
among taxpayers to pay taxes. The Head of Bari Inland Taxation Office in Puntland reported 
taxpayer reluctance, with taxpayers asking ‘But what do you do with our money? We do not 
see anything coming back to us’ (cited in Salah 2014: 13). Meanwhile, a District Finance 
Officer in Hirshabelle state described the need to use force to collect local taxes and fees: 
‘We usually use our security agents to collect and the people pay because they don’t want to 
be harassed. I am sure they don’t have the willingness to support our administration… since 
the collectors… use some funds for their personal use before reaching the finance office.’33 
Similarly, a citizen in Jubbaland described that, ‘They [the local tax administration] usually 
use militias along [with] the tax collector to create fear in the community so that nobody could 
refuse [to pay]. They don’t provide any document showing the person has paid. People don’t 
know how the collected tax is utilised. There are militias everywhere and they ask for 
payments.’34 Unsurprisingly, overall tax morale is relatively low, at least for sub-national 
 
30 Figure 4 summarises only the most commonly paid forms of formal taxes, though in the questionnaire we asked about a 
wide range of taxes and fees, including road tax, checkpoint fees, fees to private providers of electricity and education, 
and document and passport fees. The fact that these payments were not made by anyone in the sample reflects the 
reality of limited access to formal services, whether provided by a public or private actor. Livestock taxes may include 
sales tax, transit tax, export tax, and customs duties.  
31 For a discussion of the blurred lines between formal and informal taxation in another context see Paler et al. 2017. 
32 For a broader discussion of the blurriness between formal and informal rules, regulations, and institutions in the region, 
including the complicity of state officials in informal economic activities and the informalisation of tax administration, see 
Tazebew and Kefale 2021, Eid 2014, and Little, Tiki and Debsu 2015. 
33 Interview, District Finance Officer, Hirshabelle state, 2016. 
34 FGD participant, Jubbaland state, 2016. 
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administrations, with 52 per cent of respondents agreeing that the district administration 
always has the right to collect taxes.35  
 
 
3  Informal taxation and revenue generation in 
south-central Somalia 
 
In this context of persistently weak centralised statehood, and building on a history of pre-
colonial decentralised authority, south-central Somalia is characterised by a rich network of 
local governance institutions and practices. Self-reliance, self-help, and hybrid governance 
have been ‘more the norm than the exception in the Somali territories since colonial times 
and, even more significantly, since the outbreak of the civil war’ (Varming 2019: 6).36 With the 
collapse of the state in 1991, there was both a rise of coercive revenue extraction by armed 
groups and localised authorities and a further institutionalisation of systems of informal 
revenue raising and self-reliance.37 A similar situation persists today, with limited central 
state authority and presence outside of Mogadishu, reflecting a reality wherein ‘The state is 
only one actor among others, and “state order” is only one of a number of orders claiming to 
provide security, frameworks for conflict regulation and social services’ (Boege, Brown, 
Clements and Nolan 2008: 6).  
 
In this context, traditional and non-state actors play an important role in governance and the 
provision of local public goods, funded by local revenues, mainly collected in the form of 
monetary contributions or labour. Private actors, NGOs, and international organisations 
undertake most service delivery and infrastructure (Menkhaus 2006: 90, 2014b; Saggiomo 
2011; Schäferhoff 2014; United Nations Security Council 2018; Varming 2019: 6), while 
traditional authorities, including clan elders and religious leaders, play particularly important 
roles in local governance, conflict resolution and security provision, social welfare provision 
and emergency relief, and local public goods provision. Non-state service provision is well 
documented; however, the role of citizens in contributing to the funding of these public goods 
through informal tax and fee payment is often overlooked.38 We draw attention to the 
underappreciated ways that Somalis contribute to and bear the burden of public goods 
provision in the absence of a centralised, redistributive tax system. As described below and 
as summarised in Table 2, citizens pay a range of informal taxes, fees, and contributions to 
clan elders, community leaders, religious leaders, and NGOs to support (1) clan governance 




35 For context, on average across 34 African countries (excluding Somalia), 73.4 per cent of respondents agreed that the 
tax authorities always have the right to make people pay taxes (Afrobarometer 2016/2018). Of course, low tax morale 
across the country is not universal. In some areas of Jubbaland state, for instance, citizens described the importance of 
strengthening state revenue collection in order to distance themselves from what they saw as dependence on 
international aid. FGD participants, Jubbaland state, 2016.  
36 Indeed, Menkhaus (2006: 74) describes ‘the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in 
response to the prolonged absence of a central government’, emphasising that Somalia was ‘without government but 
not without governance’. 
37 There is widespread documentation of protection payments being levied during this period by localised strongmen, 
warlords, and clan militias (see e.g. Ahmad 2017: 125–126; Grosse-Kettler 2004; Menkhaus 1998, 2004b: 44, 2006: 88; 
Webersik 2004: 74). Falling somewhere between coercive extraction and taxation based on a fiscal contract, Bakonyi 
(2013) describes how the Raxanweyn Resistance Army, fighting against the clan-based militia United Somali Congress 
and Somali National Alliance in order to liberate Raxanweyn territory, established a social order, with subordinate town 
administrations developing their own mechanisms for tax and fee collection, used to finance the militia, tax collectors, 
administration, and social welfare provision.  
38 Somalis in both Somalia and the diaspora commonly contribute to clan-based obligations and community-based 
revenue raising (see e.g. Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Hansen, Horst, Menkhaus and Obare 2011; Menkhaus 2014b), 
though we predominately focus on locally-based taxpayers. 
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3.1 Clan governance and conflict resolution 
 
While having undergone substantive changes under colonial rule and post-colonial 
statebuilding, clans remain a cornerstone of social and political organisation among nomadic-
pastoralist Somalis,39 while having been integrated with the post-colonial state apparatus 
(Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005; Lewis 1998a; Mohamed 2007). Kinship (tol) is founded on a 
segmentary lineage system under which people trace their descent to common male 
ancestors, which may be hierarchically divided into clan families, clans, sub-clans, primary 
lineages, and diya-paying groups (Lewis 1998a: 4, see Appendix 6. In considering local 
governance and informal revenue raising, the most important constituency is the diya-paying 
group (as it is often described in English), representing the smallest social unit (from a few 
hundred to a few thousand men), bound by the closest kinship ties, with members taking 
collective responsibility for their own security and common help (Le Sage 2005; Lewis 2002: 
11). This group is effectively ‘the basic political and jural unit of pastoral society’ (Lewis 
1998a: 6; see also Farah and Lewis 1993: 12), underpinned by ‘group feeling’ (tolnimo), 
making possible cooperation and assistance to others (isu hiilin) (Mohamed 2007: 239; see 
also Lewis 2002: 11). Within this lineage system, clan elders represent the most important 
figures in governance at every level of clan families, having gained greater importance in 
political life and development with the collapse of the state (Gundel 2006: iv).40 At the lowest 
level, elders (normally known in the south as nabodoon), ‘are the daily managers’ of the diya-
paying groups, whom individual Somalis ‘simply cannot do without’ (Gundel 2006: 45).41  
 
There are a range of payments and contributions collected by clan elders to manage local 
governance and conflicts, underpinned by customary laws, or xeer. In Somali society, 
resolving conflicts is a collective responsibility, with one of the general principles (xissi 
adkaaday) of customary law being the resolution of conflicts through retribution, financed by 
the collective. In line with this principle, clan members pay diya (in Arabic), usually translated 
as blood compensation, in cases of death, physical harm, theft, rape, loss of property, 
defamation (PDRC 2003: 19–20),42 with one diya-paying group collectively paying the 
compensation to the victim’s family in another diya-paying group (Le Sage 2005; Lewis 
1998a: 6; PDRC 2003: 19–20).43 Diya thus reflects a form of communal burden sharing that 
both contributes to stability and peace, and represents a financial burden on households.44 
 
39 The discussion of clans here provides only an overview of general practices among majority clans, who predominate in 
Gedo region. In Gedo region, the majority of the population is from the Marehan clan (a subclan of the Darod), though 
also includes those from the Raxanweyn, Ogaden, and Harti clans, and a small percentage of Bantu peoples (see 
Appendix 3). Our sample population is 95 per cent Marehan, while only 2 per cent of our sample population reported 
speaking Af-Maay, spoken predominately by the minority Raxanweyn.  
40 Though the specific histories and forms of traditional authority vary across regions, in general clan authority has two 
layers, ‘with a high level group of lineage elders representing the clan family level, and a level of elders representing the 
mag [diya] paying group’ (Gundel 2006: 44), though there are not always such clear distinctions. 
41 Notably, the titles used vary from one clan-group to another, as well as across regions and between the north and 
south. Titles for high-level elders include Suldaan, Garaad, Boqor, Ugaas, Islaan, Beel Daje, Imam, and Malaakh. Titles 
for the diya-paying group of elders include aqiil and nabodoon.  
42 Depending on the crime, the payment may be referred to differently; for example, in some instances of rape, the victim’s 
clan may be given xumayn (compensation for abuse), while in instances of moral injury, including verbal insults, 
compensation may be called haal (Lewis 1994: 109–110). Regardless of the term, the concept of collective 
compensation is the same. For simplicity, we use diya as a generic term for collective compensation (also known as 
mag). 
43 Within clans, sub-groups take a portion of the diya payment, with the distribution of the burden of this payment on 
individuals being decided by clan elders within the diya-paying group, with clan elders assigning all men a mandatory 
amount to pay. Payment is made exclusively by men, as women ‘are not regarded as paying or receiving members 
when it comes to the group paying out compensation or sharing compensation received… the amount to be paid or 
received is divided by the number of men in the group… A family which has only girl children will thus have less to pay 
in diya contributions but will also receive less [in the case of compensation’ (J. Gardner and Warsame 2004: 157). 
Reflecting Islamic influence, diya is also a common practice in Islamic law, with references to payment in both the qur’an 
and the hadith (The Qur’an, n.d.: 4: 92; see also Emon 2012; Peters 2006; Spevack 2015). Valuation of diya is 
underpinned by sharia law, with an Islamic jurisprudential scholar (qaadi) determining the diya, with clan elders abiding 
by the decision. For the death of a man, the amount due is one hundred camels, while ‘a woman’s life is valued at half 
that figure’ and other injuries are ‘similarly compounded in a standard tariff of damages expressed in different amounts 
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Similarly reflecting these principles of collective responsibility, diya group members may be 
required to make clan debt relief payments (qaan), which shift the liability of debt from a clan 
member to the diya group as a whole. While there is some question about whether this is 
mandatory in the same way as diya or whether it is a voluntary contribution to assist fellow 
clan members, it is commonly paid by households in the region. Further, customary law 
includes public resource-utilisation rules for water, pasture, and other natural resources to 
ensure their best and fair usage (Gundel 2006: 15; PDRC 2003), which in some contexts can 
require a type of fee paid to clan elders or the managers of the resource for use of common 
clan land or resources (see e.g. Linkenback 2001: 24). While not a generally defined 
principle or requirement, individuals may also be required to pay conflict resolution fees in 
order to fund dispute meetings and provide logistical support, food, and refreshments for 
those clan leaders entrusted with maintaining knowledge of xeer application (known as xeer 
beegti). Where informal communal financial obligations cannot be met, in some contexts, 
group members may provide labour contributions to clan elders, while clan elders may also 
solicit personal financial contributions from clan members (through what is known as shahad) 
to support their own households.45  
 
3.2 Security provision 
 
Given the underlying context of insecurity, in some areas clan elders levy informal taxes to 
finance community-based security. As Lewis (2002: 11) notes, ‘[e]ven under modern 
administration self-help still retains much force… with the difficulty under present conditions 
of adequately policing much of the country, the security of the individual pastoralist’s person 
and property depends ultimately upon his membership of a diya-paying group’.46 In contexts 
of conflict between two clans, for example, communities may organise the equivalent of 
‘neighbourhood watch’ groups, with armed young men protecting the clan and their property, 
with clan elders collecting money and livestock for the upkeep of these local security 
groups.47 In some areas of Hirshabelle state, for example, community leaders reported that 
citizens are required to make direct security payments, often called ‘safety fees’, to the 
village security council, while some clans levied exceptional, ad hoc informal taxes on 
households or used revenues from other clan-based taxes to procure weapons.48  
 
Outside of security taxes levied by clan leaders, there is a long history of protection 
payments and taxes being levied by armed actors, including Islamist militants. As with armed 
group taxation more broadly, there is often a blurred line between extortion, taxation, and 
security provision in contexts of insecurity (Revkin 2020; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp 
2014).49 To protect research participants and enumerators, we did not ask directly about 
 
of camels’ (Lewis 2002: 8; see also PDRC 2003: 27). This rate is most likely derived from a pre-Islamic Arab tradition 
that was later adopted by Sharia law (PDRC 2003: 28, 163–165). 
44 The contribution to peace and stability is clear – where diya is not paid or accepted as a form of collective 
compensation, qisaas (revenge, or ‘eye for an eye’ justice) applies.  
45 Gundel (2006: 49) notes that while ‘many elders are reliant on shahad as their primary source of household income… 
such “begging” demeans them in the eyes of their clansmen and compromises their impartiality in settling disputes’. 
46 See also Menkhaus (2014a) for discussion of the continued importance of community policing.  
47 Menkhaus (2004a) describes forms of neighbourhood watch systems and paid protection forces, while we find evidence 
of their persistence in some areas of instability in Jubbaland and Hirshabelle states. 
48 In some cases, the diaspora plays a significant role in funding clan militias, which can be a source of escalating clan 
conflict. 
49 As Menkhaus (2008: 222) notes of the civil war period, when armed groups settled in communities, ‘the symbiotic 
relationship between gunman and villager evolves, [and] the line between extortion and taxation, between protection 
racket and police force is blurred, and a system of governance within anarchy is born’. Similarly, Menkhaus (2004a: 32) 
notes that ‘protection rackets and mafioso behaviour are hardly ideal, and sometimes engender local resistance, but 
they do nonetheless provide a more predictable security environment for local communities. In some cases, these 
arrangements have moved into a grey area between extortion and taxation, between protection racket and nascent 
security force’. We follow scholars of rebel governance in distinguishing armed group taxation from ‘corruption’ or 
extortion by its foundation in ‘publicly known rules and procedures’, with the important distinction that tax-like payments 
are ‘justified on public interest grounds (i.e. supporting a religious ideology, financing public goods, paying for the costs 
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informal taxation by non-state armed groups. Nevertheless, in an open-ended question about 
other informal payments made, 15 per cent of respondents reported making contributions to 
non-state armed groups.50 Key informants confirmed that al-Shabaab commonly levies 
monetary and non-monetary (i.e. livestock, farm produce) taxes on individuals and 
businesses in Gedo region.51 This includes the taxation of farms and agricultural produce 
(dalag), taxation of goods being transported (badeeco), taxation of livestock sales (xoolo), 
registration and taxation of transitting vehicles (gaadiid), the taxation of land sales, and the 
taxation of all major businesses through the zakat (Hiraal Institute 2018, 2020a; Kisiangani 
2011; Musa et al. 2020; Mwangi 2012; United Nations Security Council, 2011, 2018).52 
Additionally, al-Shabaab is reported to occasionally collect infaq, referring to a qur’anic 
payment to please God without hoping to receive anything in return, and ‘jihad contributions’ 
(Levy and Yusuf 2019; Mwangi 2012), while outside of Gedo region, the group gains 
significant revenues from customs taxes at the country’s major ports. In some areas, this tax 
collection is assisted by clan elders (Hiraal Institute 2018),53 while being more broadly 
facilitated by poorly regulated telecommunications and financial entities, over which al-
Shabaab has considerable influence (United Nations Security Council 2018: para. 83). This 
extraction is undeniably coercive, with the ‘collection of taxes enforced through violence and 
intimidation’, including through the threat of execution (Hiraal Institute 2018; Levy and Yusuf 
2019; United Nations Security Council 2018: para. 83), though nevertheless can contribute to 
the provision of public goods and infrastructure (Marchal 2018: 349; UN Habitat 2018: 25).54 
This does not mean it is voluntary, with the Hiraal Institute (2020a: 1, 6) reporting ‘an almost 
universal desire among taxpayers to be taxed solely by the Somali government’, with 
payment having ‘little to do with recognising the legitimacy of the group and more to do with 
the practicality of real life, which makes it impossible to conduct business in areas where the 
group has operational presence’. 
 
3.3 Social welfare and local public goods provision 
 
Finally, clan, religious, and village leaders – often working in collaboration – are central in 
providing social welfare and emergency relief in the absence of assistance from the state.55 
For example, qaaraan is a particularly important form of social welfare contribution levied by 
clan or community leaders, often described as a general ‘welfare tax’ or as akin to a clan- or 
community-based social insurance.56 Revenues from qaaraan may be used for general clan 
 
of war, or redistributing assets from rich to poor) whereas theft is justified only by a self-serving desire for private gain’ 
(Revkin 2020).  
50 We assume that this reports a lower bound for actual payments made to such groups. 
51 As described in Section 2 above, al-Shabaab continues to exercise control in large parts of the rural areas of Jubbaland 
state and in most of the rural areas and roads between districts in Gedo region, as well as territory in the southeast of 
the district (Hansen 2016; Hiraal Institute 2020b; UN Habitat 2018: 5,6). In line with the discussion above, al-Shabaab’s 
revenue generation conforms to the standard definition of taxation, even if it is coercive. It is enforced through an 
efficient administration and bureaucracy that tightly controls and monitors tax collection and internal audits and 
undertakes tax assessments while the United Nations describes its taxation as ‘accountable and predictable’ (United 
Nations Security Council 2018: paras. 85–86). 
52 In this context zakat is levied at 2.5 per cent of the monetary value of a business (before profit) as assessed by al-
Shabaab accountants.  
53 This is also supported by interviews with taxpayers in Hirshabelle state, 2016. Levy and Yusuf (2019: 10) describe that 
‘Tribal elders play central roles as community leaders. Al-Shabaab coopts them to keep order in the areas under its 
control. It delegates taxation and policing to elders, who have preexisting authority among local populations. In return, 
al-Shabaab refrains from punishing cooperative clans, facilitates arbitration of inter-tribal disputes, and provides financial 
assistance to some clans.’ 
54 In Jubbaland, UN Habitat (2018: 25) additionally notes that al-Shabaab represents some form of alternative ‘land 
authority’ in rural areas, resolving land disputes and collecting a form of land tax.  
55 Village leaders hold informal administrative positions outside of both the clan and the government. They act as leaders 
in communities, with clan elders (across clans or sub-clans) responding to them, as well as community liaisons to district 
governments. At the village level, multiple committees that focus on development (e.g. health, water, inter-clan peace) 
involve both clan elders and village leaders. 
56 As described by a clan leader, ‘Qaaraan is just clan insurance. The clan member will have the benefit of insurance. In 
case he/she…[has] a problem, the other clan members have to contribute some qaaraan to solve that.’ Interview, clan 
leader, Jubbaland state, 2016.  
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expenses, including facilitating elder meetings and security and peace dialogues, assisting 
the needy, or providing support for community members, as in the case of illness or for 
funeral expenses. Additionally, clan elders and religious leaders commonly organise and 
collect revenues for emergency assistance, often in collaboration with NGOs, international 
agencies, and/or the government (see e.g. Varming 2019).57 While diya is levied only within 
clans, qaaraan can be levied outside of a specific clan. The payment is often negotiable, with 
individuals discussing with elders the amount they could pay (unlike diya, for which 
households are assigned an amount to pay) and, while not mandatory in principle, was often 
described by individuals as effectively required, given the social pressures to contribute. 
Indeed, non-payment is seen in some contexts as a breakdown in social solidarity and a sign 
of anti-social behaviour, while payment bestows reciprocal benefits and respect on those that 
contribute. 
 
Social welfare is also provided through other channels, including through the generally 
accepted customary legal principle that involves collective contributions of livestock or other 
assets to the poor (Le Sage 2005; PDRC 2003).58 While Le Sage (2005: 37) notes that ‘after 
the pauperisation that accompanied the civil war, the commitment of sub-clans and diya 
groups to provide material assistance to relatives and the poor… diminished’, such payments 
remain central to informal social welfare provision in some areas. Another important way that 
Somalis contribute to social welfare provision is through zakat, one of the Five Pillars of 
Islam, referring to a mandatory contribution to help the poor, compulsory for all those that 
can afford it.59  
In addition to social welfare, Somalis contribute to local public goods provision in a variety of 
ways, including contributions to support the maintenance or building of local public goods, 
including through community development projects, such as sanitation programmes, road 
rehabilitation, street lighting, or the building of public markets, community centres, or 
administrative buildings.60 As in many contexts, ‘informal taxation is one of the primary ways 
through which local public goods are financed’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 12). In south-central 
Somalia, such projects often involve multiple actors – including clans, religious leaders, 
community groups, businesses and business associations, NGOs, or the government itself – 
often working with or with the approval of clan leaders and/or local government 
administrations.61 Frequently, these forms of community development projects take the form 
of religious leaders calling on individuals and businesses to support mosque renovations or 
improvements.62 In other instances, public goods may be funded jointly with NGOs or the 
state. As described by a community leader, ‘For some of the development projects like the 
community hall, an NGO paid most of the budget and the community contributed 20 per cent. 
The clan elders were responsible [for] collecting these payments and I was working with 
them.’63 In addition to funding public infrastructure, households commonly pay informal taxes 
 
57 In the course of the exploratory study in 2016, for example, we observed community-based revenue generation to 
support emergency assistance for mass flooding in Hirshabelle state that displaced a large segment of the population. 
Even in locations with insecurity and tension within and across communities, community members commonly 
contributed to and collaborated on emergency assistance projects, including a large degree of cross-community and 
cross-clan collaboration in Hirshabelle and Jubbaland states.  
58 We do not consider here yarad (dowry) as, though it is also defined in customary law, it has weaker links to social 
welfare provision and wealth redistribution.  
59 This is distinct from the Islamic obligation to pay sadaqah. As noted above, we do not consider sadaqah in this analysis, 
as we perceive it to be closer to charity than it is to an informal tax.  
60 We do not consider user fees for services, which are common given that private companies commonly provide water, 
electricity, and schooling. Instead, we consider public goods and informal forms of revenue generation to support them. 
61 Commonly, for example, an actor – say, the local government administration or an NGO – may provide materials for a 
community development project, with community members being called upon to contribute labour and cash or in-kind 
contributions. 
62 For, instance, in our exploratory study, religious leaders in Hirshabelle state explained that it was common to request 
US$5-10 from individuals and US$700 from businesses.  
63 Interview, community leader, Jubbaland state, 2016. In another case, a civil society organisation directly mobilised 
contributions from households in the community for a well rehabilitation project. Interview, community leader, 
Hirshabelle state, 2016.  
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and fees to teachers and schools to finance schools (both secular and Islamic) that are not 
funded by the state. In some areas, both urban and rural, citizens also contribute to regular 
town cleaning and communal labour exercises, involving the cleaning or maintenance of 





Table 2 Typology of informal taxation and revenue generation64 
 
Umbrella group Informal payment Somali  Levying authority (HH 
survey, general 
population, N 1,297)65 











Diya/blood compensation Diyada iyo 
magta/diya 
Clan elders (84%), 
village leader (44%) 
62.3 57.5 Nothing (67%) 
Taxes on land/resources as a means of 
controlling resources* 
 Clan elders    





Clan elders (55%), 
village leader (53%) 
73.1 69.4 Nothing (61%) 
Conflict resolution fees Qaabka xalinta 
qilaafaadka 
Village leader (70%), 
clan elders (54%) 
68.9 72.3 Nothing (52%) 
Labour contributions to clan or village leaders Tabarucaad 




Village leader (67%), 
clan elders (39%) 
59.1 66.7 Nothing (53%) 
Security provision Clan-based security/safety fees/payments*  Clan elders - - - 
Payments to armed groups/protection payments*  Armed groups, 
including al-Shabaab 





Social welfare tax/emergency assistance Qaaraanka 
qabiilka 
Clan elders (84%), 
village leader (37%) 
69.4 74.5 Nothing (63%) 




Clan elders (68%), 
village leader (61%) 
80.8 79.5 Nothing (66%) 
Religious contributions (including zakat and 
contributions for mosque improvements) 
Qaaraan diimeed Religious leaders 
(49%), clan elders 
(43%) 
80.9 79.5 Nothing (50%), 
respect (31%) 
 
64 Payments marked with an asterisk were not included in the survey. In the survey, we included all religious contributions together, though recognise that there would be analytic value to 
having them separated. 
65 Percentages do not equal 100 per cent, since in most cases respondents are paying to multiple actors at the same time. 
66 The survey question reads: ‘How do you perceive the likelihood to get punished if you don’t contribute?’ Options range from very likely to very unlikely. 
67 The survey question reads: ‘Do you feel like the amount of this contribution you normally pay is very fair, somewhat fair, not too fair, or not fair at all?’ 
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Contributions to maintenance or building of local 
public goods/community development projects 




Village leader (70%), 
clan elders (57%) 
61.5 47.1 Nothing (41%), 
community 
development (24%) 
Contributions to schools/schoolteachers’ salaries  Schools/schoolteachers - - - 
Town cleaning/communal labour Nadaafinta 
magaalada/ 
Shaqo bulsho 
Village leader (66%), 
clan elders (32%) 





4  Magnitude and distribution of informal 
taxation and revenue generation 
 
Building on this conceptual understanding of the nature of informal revenue generation in 
Gedo region, we further explore the magnitude and distribution of informal payments. First, 
we find a high prevalence of informal taxation and revenue generation, with 71 per cent of 
respondents in the general sample reporting having paid at least one informal tax or fee in 
the previous year, broadly comparable to previous studies of informal taxation in other 
contexts.68 Disaggregated findings are reported in Figure 5 below, for both the general and 
the vulnerable sample. Qaaraan, diya and religious contributions are the most common types 
of payments in both samples, with the sample of vulnerable citizens less likely to make 
informal payments,69 potentially reflecting local norms of collective responsibility for poorer 
individuals and females. Overall, although access to public goods is limited overall (Appendix 
2) – in line with expectations given the limited nature of state revenues described in Section 
2 – community leaders reported that settlements are heavily reliant on voluntary contributions 
in order to maintain local public goods where they do exist (Figure 6). This evidence 
reinforces the argument that informal contributions represent a key source of local public 
finance in fragile contexts. 
 
 




68 Using micro-data from ten countries and capturing informal taxes for public works projects, Olken and Singhal (2011) 
find that informal tax payments are widespread in rural areas, reaching over 50 per cent of households in some 
countries (Ethiopia, Indonesia, Vietnam) and an average of 20 per cent in all countries under study. Similarly, 
considering informal taxes for public works projects, Walker (2017) finds that over 40 per cent of households made 
informal payments in the previous year. Using a wider definition of informal taxation – similar to that used here – in 
Sierra Leone, various studies have shown that 69 per cent of households reported paying at least one informal tax in 
the previous year (van den Boogaard et al. 2019) and 99 per cent of households reported paying at least one informal 
tax or user fee (van den Boogaard 2020), with communal labour largely accounting for this near universality in the latter 
case. Meanwhile Paler et al. (2017) similarly report widespread informal taxation paid to both state and non-state actors. 
69 In the sample of vulnerable citizens, only 38 per cent paid at least one informal tax or fee in the previous year. 
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Figure 6 Percentage of settlements reliant on community contributions to maintain 
local public goods70 
 
As a second exercise, we compute the relative incidence of informal payments in relation to 
income, in order to gauge the burden that informal contributions impose on households. We 
first calculate the annual income for each respondent, dropping the 18 per cent of the sample 
without any annual income (as the ratio of contributions over zero income is not 
computationally possible). We then calculate total informal payments made by households in 
a year, by summing up payments made in cash and those made in labour days. In the 
general population sample, most informal contributions are paid in cash, while labour 
represents a negligible share of what households contribute – only a few days in a year. 
These amounts are reported in Table 3 below. We monetise the labour days by multiplying 
each day of labour by the daily wage, which is fairly constant across the whole Gedo region 
(estimated at US$8, which is a common compensation amount for cash-for-work 
programmes). Overall, informal contributions represent a non-negligible share of annual 
household income, at 9.5 per cent on average. Given the extreme nature of the case of 
Somalia, it is unsurprising that this share is higher than found elsewhere, including in 
Ethiopia (6.8 per cent) (Olken and Singhal 2011), Kenya (2.5 per cent) (Walker 2017), and 
Sierra Leone (5 per cent) (van den Boogaard et al. 2019). 
Third, we also consider the separate burden imposed by cash and labour contributions. 
Reflecting the fact that most of the households contribute in cash (Table 3), the incidence of 
cash is much higher than that of labour. Cash payments comprise about 10 per cent of 
annual income, while labour represents a negligible 0.7 per cent on average. 
  
 
70 Data reflects public services that are present in at least 10 per cent of villages, with all other public services dropped 
because of a lack of frequency. Garbage collection only happens in 11 per cent of the sample. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Primary school (N=51)
Paved road (N=20)




Table 3 Average annual contributions (USD and labour days)71  
 
     N  Median 
Qaaraan: cash 679 122.6 
Qaaraan: labour days 676 0 
Diya: cash 595 177.6 
Diya: labour days 594 0 
Labour contributions to leader: cash 89 22.2 
Labour contributions to leader: labour days 90 0 
Clan debt relief: cash 255 106.6 
Clan debt relief: labour days 255 0 
Conflict resolution fees: cash 227 19.1 
Conflict resolution fees: labour days 231 2 
Zakat: cash 408 88.8 
Zakat: labour days 408 2 
Town cleaning: cash 205 37.3 
Town cleaning: labour days 208 1 
Communal labour: cash 82 1.8 
Communal labour: labour days 82 0 
Contributions for community development 
projects: cash 80 .9 
Contributions for community development 
projects: labour days 79 2 
 
 
Fourth, we consider how the burden of informal taxes is distributed among individual 
households considering the extent to which informal revenue generation represents a 
proportionally greater burden on lower income households than higher income ones. Earlier 
accounts of informal taxation showed that informal taxes can be less regressive than the 
formal tax system on account as informal taxing actors are embedded within communities 
and may thus be more likely to enact informal exemptions and uphold principles of local 
moral economies.72 Broader evidence, including more recent empirical analysis, however, 
shows that informal taxation and revenue generation is often regressive in its impact, with 
lower income quintiles paying more informal taxes and fees in relation to their incomes than 
higher income quintiles across diverse contexts (Beard 2007; Lin and Liu 2007; Olken and 
Singhal 2011; Paler et al. 2017; Thomas 1987; van den Boogaard et al. 2019; Walker 2017).  
We find that informal payments are not regressive at the extensive margin, as more 
vulnerable populations contribute less, but are regressive at the intensive margin among 
those that make some payment. More in detail, we document that, at the participation level, 
or extensive margin, the vulnerable sample is about half as likely to contribute for each 
specific payment than the general sample, as displayed in Figure 3 above. When it comes to 
restricting our focus to those that pay anything and plotting their contributions over a wealth 
index,73 we see stark evidence of the overall regressive nature of cash-based payments for 
both the general and vulnerable populations, and the regressive nature of labour-based 
payments for the vulnerable sample only – while they seem to be progressive for the 
wealthier general sample (Figure 7).74 By contrast, though prevalence of formal taxation is 
 
71 As the distribution of contributions was particularly noisy, we trimmed the sample to the 95th percentile and only report 
median contributions. For the same reason, we report median values instead of average values. For what concerns 
unconditional contribution values, as measured over the whole sample, we omit the corresponding table since the 
median values are all zero. This is due to the fact that respondents not contributing are given a value of zero for each 
contribution and this inevitably shifts the distribution of amounts toward zero.  
72 For example, Barkan and Holmquist (1986: i) argue that in Kenya ‘the landless obtain benefits from Harambee [self-help 
activities] projects as virtual “free riders” while “rich” peasants […] subsidize the poorer elements of the community.’ 
73 The same index used in Table 1. 
74 In the literature, regressivity is usually measured based on the ratio of cash contributions to household income. 
However, since our estimates of household income are very noisy, we use a wealth index as the most credible proxy.  
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limited, mostly represented by livestock tax, the distribution is relatively evenly distributed 
among income groups, paid by both the poorest and richest households.75 




Note: refer to footnote 16 for the construction of the wealth index. In the figures above, wealth deciles 8, 9 and 10 are merged 
together given the underlying distribution of the wealth index, i.e the index having many identical large values. 
 
As far as the incidence of contributions as a proportion of income is concerned, Figure 8 
below illustrates a similar pattern of regressivity. Lower income deciles bear a 
disproportionately higher burden of informal contributions as a proportion of their income 
relative to higher income deciles. For instance, while informal contributions represent about 
30 per cent of annual income in the poorest decile, they comprise a ten-times smaller share 
in the middle-higher income deciles (7–10). Breaking this down by type of contributions, the 
same regressivity is noticed for both cash and labour. Especially with labour, this type of 
contribution is non-existent among middle-higher income deciles, while it represents about 2 
per cent of the annual income in the lowest deciles.  





75 Tables available upon request.  
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Aside from the uneven individual distribution of informal taxes, when informal revenue 
generation replaces a centralised system of taxation and redistribution, it has unequal 
community-level effects. When the responsibility for financing public goods falls on 
individuals, rather than the state, access to public goods and the quality of those goods will 
depend on the relative wealth of the local community, implying uneven distributional effects 
within countries and regions. 76 In Kenya, for example, harambee, or community-based self-
help activities, effectively served as a counter-welfare programme, since the more privileged 
were more capable of creating and participating in self-help programmes. Wealthier 
communities could raise greater amounts of money and draw on the skills of their better-
educated populations, while they were more likely to possess links to political elites 
(Moskowitz 2017: 53; see also Winans and Haugerud 1977).77 In Gedo region, we find that 
on average individuals in wealthier communities make more informal payments and 
contributions than in poorer ones, as shown in Figure 9.78 Unsurprisingly, access to public 
goods is similarly distributed unequally, with wealthier communities having a greater number 
of basic public goods (Figure 10). This is in line with expectations that where there is no 
centralised redistributive system, communities will have unequal capacity to fill the revenue 
and service provision gap left by the state.79 





76 Stratified equity outcomes may be exacerbated where the wealthiest are able to opt out of public goods through the 
private market (see e.g. Bearse, Glomm and Eckhard 2000; Catterall 1988; Fink, Kandpal and Shapira 2019; van de 
Walle 1995). There is ample evidence linking user fees and privatisation to inequities of access in both low-income and 
highly industrialised contexts (e.g. Allard 2014; MacLean 2017; MacLean and Brass 2015; G. D. Wood 1997), while 
similar patterns are observable when local public goods like education are reliant on local financing (e.g. Metzler 2003). 
77 In industrialised contexts, research has similarly shown that voluntary contributions to parent-teacher associations 
reinforce inequities in education across districts (Bice and Hoyt 2000; Brunner and Sonstelie 2006; Schaller and Nisbet 
2020; Winerip 2003). 
78 The village wealth index is derived from the village leader survey. A number of different indicators are included in the 
index: public service availability (primary school, hospital, post office, garbage disposal system, paved road, a water 
source), the price to buy soap or salt, whether the village has been visited by a district or national government official in 
the last year, and whether the village council has an office.  
79 In this sense, the prevalence of informal revenue generation can effectively represent ‘a decision by the state not to 
assume responsibility for the provision of public welfare’ (Handley 2020: 157), with inequitable outcomes. In Somalia, of 
course, this may not be a ‘decision’ of the state, so much as a reality of the decentralised nature of political power and 
the persistent challenges in establishing a centralised authority, as described above. Interestingly, the geographic 
inequities that arise from an over-reliance on informal taxation mirror broader discussions of inequities associated with 
the financing of essential public goods through certain property taxation (see e.g. Alemán 2007; Kelly 1995).  
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Figure 10 Public service provision by village wealth decile  
 
 
Finally, we explore whether the incidence of informal tax payments varies across sub-
populations. As expected, in line with cultural customs around male-headed households and 
males taking responsibility for female family members, men are significantly more likely to 
make informal payments than women (73 per cent relative to 61 per cent, a difference in 
means which is significant at the 1 per cent level). There is also some indication that 
networks and community participation also influence incidence of tax payment. For instance, 
while those whose village leader, clan elder, or religious leader knows their name are not 
significantly more or less likely to make informal payments, those that are not members of a 
community group are significantly more likely to make informal payments than those who are 
either leaders or members of community groups (71 per cent relative to 62 per cent, 
significant at the 5 per cent level).80 However, we find no significant evidence that being from 
a dominant clan family (namely, the Marehan in Gedo region (67 per cent relative to 71 per 
cent, insignificant) or reporting interest in public affairs (68 per cent relative to 70 per cent, 
insignificant) affects incidence of contributions.  
 
 
5  Explaining informal taxation and revenue 
generation 
 
As described above, informal revenue generation is prevalent in Gedo region, representing a 
critical mechanism through which communities self-finance public goods provision, social 
welfare and redistribution, conflict resolution, and local governance and security. Given the 
long period of state collapse and longstanding history of decentralised political authority in 
the region, this high prevalence may not be particularly surprising. Nevertheless, given the 
diversity of informal payments and the high burden that they represent for individuals and 
households, it is useful to further parse common explanations for the prevalence of informal 
revenue generation. As noted above, south-central Somalia is a particularly revelatory case 
within which to explore a little-understood phenomenon, representing a suitable case for 
theory testing. Building on the seminal work of Olken and Singhal (2011), we explore the four 
non-mutually exclusive hypotheses that they propose for explaining the prevalence of 
informal taxation: first, that informal taxes arise as a response to constraints on formal taxes; 
 
80 Community groups include religious groups that meet outside of regular worship services, women’s associations, youth 
associations, political groups, cultural or ethnic associations, trade or market associations or cooperatives, social 
groups, and credit or savings groups.  
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second, that informal taxes represent an optimal response to information and enforcement; 
third, that informal taxes represent user fees or benefits taxes; and fourth, that informal taxes 
are more like voluntary contributions than they are formal taxes. In the context of Gedo 
region, we explore each of these possibilities. Capturing a broader and more diverse 
spectrum of payments, we add nuance to these explanations, considering how they may 
differ across disaggregated types of informal taxes, user fees, and contributions, and extend 
the explanations with reference to the unique context of south-central Somalia.  
 
5.1 Informal taxes as a response to constraints on formal taxes? 
 
First, Olken and Singhal (2011: 20) propose that ‘informal taxation is simply a response to 
constraints on the ability of local governments to raise formal taxes to meet their demand for 
local public goods’, either through legal constraints on sub-national taxation or because of a 
lack of capacity to effectively tax. While there are no legal constraints on formal taxes – as 
described above, in fact, the central government has no de facto oversight over sub-national 
taxation – the capacity constraints and limited reach of the government described in Section 
2 effectively mean that ‘informal taxation may be the only mechanisms through which 
additional public goods can be financed’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 20). In Somalia, it is 
clearly plausible that informal taxes and the citizens who pay for them are filling a gap left by 
weak state capacity. As described in Section 2, the government has the weakest formal 
taxing capacity in the world. The FGS does not collect taxes outside of Mogadishu, while 
total revenues for Jubbaland state amounted to only US$6.5 per capita in 2018 (US$6.2 in 
per capita tax revenue).81 Evidently, the government is unable to provide much of anything in 
the way of public services and infrastructure. Where government fails to provide basic public 
services, citizens step in to fill gaps left by the state, ‘taking on core state services like 
building roads and providing health care and education’ (Dahir 2020).82 ‘We have to rely on 
ourselves’, says Dr Amina Abdulkadir Isack, while another Somali citizen expressed, ‘I don’t 
think we should wait for the government… I just want us to be prepared so that we can save 
ourselves’ (cited in Dahir 2020).  
 
While this self-reliance emerged in part from state weakness after its collapse in the 1990s, it 
moreover reflects a long trend of self-sufficiency in line with the history of atomised rule in the 
region, as well as state weakness that long predates the state’s collapse. While there were 
pre-colonial centralised tax-levying sultanates, these were relatively short-lived and 
regionally bound, with a lack of central authority necessitating clan-based solutions for 
governance, security, and social welfare. The importance, or necessity, of decentralised 
political structures was further amplified by the concept of self-reliance embraced by both 
colonial authorities and the post-colonial state (Ahmed I. Samatar 1987; Varming 2019; see 
also L. Gardner 2012). Indeed, under the post-colonial military dictatorship of Barre, self-help 
and hybrid financing of public goods provision were encouraged, in line with a broader trend 
on the continent of post-colonial leaders embracing a philosophy of ‘self-reliance’ as a means 
of rejecting both capitalism and colonialism (Menkhaus 2006; Abdi Ismail Samatar 1988; 
Varming 2019).  
At the same time, it is clear that informal taxes are not simply filling a gap left by the state to 
provide essential services, but that the gap of state authority incentivises non-state actors to 
compete with the state to extract revenue. The government’s lack of capacity to assert its 
 
81 For the FGS, using the most recent population estimates (UNFPA 2014), from 2013 to 2018, total domestic revenues 
amounted on average to only US$11.3, while total tax revenues amounted to only US$8.5. Given that the central 
government does not collect revenue outside of Mogadishu, we likewise consider per capita figures on the basis of the 
population in Benaadir region alone. Even with this more limited population, per capita domestic revenue from 2013 to 
2018 amounted on average to only US$84.1 while per capita tax revenue over the same period amounted to only 
US$63.4. In any case, the amount of revenue available to provide essential services and infrastructure is evidently low.  
82 Alternatively, in at least some regions, Mwangi (2012: 524–526) notes that the lack of national civil service and 
functional government means that al-Shabaab ‘has been the only organization that can provide such services’, including 
public works projects such as building bridges and repairing roads (see also Shinn 2011: 215).  
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authority and control armed group taxation, for instance, leads to a proliferation of informal 
taxes and illegal levies by these groups. This lack of capacity is particularly well evidenced 
by the reality that even government officials have to pay taxes to al-Shabaab (Hiraal Institute 
2020a). Moreover, it is clear that in some cases, informal and formal taxation ‘may fund 
different types of public goods’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 25), that the state may have no 
interest in financing. Relatedly, given that a significant proportion of informal contributions are 
made in labour (see Section 4), informal payments may not be compatible with state 
finances.  
Evidence suggests, however, that the government lacks not only capacity but also the will to 
levy direct taxes or to regulate informal taxes. This largely reflects its complicity with and 
reliance on both the business community (Ahmad 2017; Musa et al. 2020; Salah 2014) and 
clans to govern and to maintain peace and stability. For example, the federal government 
has effectively chosen not to target large companies in urban areas. Major economic sectors, 
including telecommunications, remittances, and electricity generation and distribution, are 
undertaxed, though large corporations in these sectors ‘have the potential to contribute far 
greater revenues than currently’, while taxes on wages and business income could be 
collected with relative ease by focusing on ‘the small number of taxpayers likely to have the 
largest tax bills’ (World Bank 2017: 27, 31). In at least some parts of the country, this reflects 
an unwillingness to tax businesses, rather than a lack of institutional capacity. For example, 
as Musa et al. (2020: 8) explain, the Somaliland government ‘has repeatedly turned to 
powerful businessmen and companies for loans which makes the state beholden to them’ 
and the resultant political settlements (see also Musa and Horst 2019; Phillips 2016). 
Meanwhile, evidence from Puntland suggests that the poor face a particularly high burden of 
local government taxes, with local governments targeting small businesses and market 
vendors with daily operating fees, though largely leaving ‘politically powerful’ businesses 
under- or un-taxed (Salah 2014: 12–13). 
Moreover, our survey evidence suggests that sub-national governments may actually benefit 
from the outcomes enabled by informal taxes (Table 4) and may thus have little incentive to 
control them. In Table 4, we regress indicators of tax morale disaggregated by state (district) 
and non-state (village, clan, religious) actors on three indicators of informal contributions: (i) 
in panel A, we use an indicator variable for the number of informal contributions paid by a 
given respondent being above the median in the sample, which is 2; (ii) in panel B, we 
consider an indicator for paying in cash more than the median respondent in the sample 
(US$3.2); while (iii) in panel C, we adopt an indicator for contributing a number of labour 
days above the median value in the sample (0 days). To increase the sample size available, 
we assign zero to cash and labour contributions of all non-payers. 
First, we find that informal revenue generation is positively correlated with state-related tax 
morale. From panel A, a higher level of informal revenue generation corresponds to 12 
percentage points higher tax morale regarding the district government (column 2), or 23 per 
cent of the average tax morale. This coefficient is larger for state actors than for non-state 
ones, also given the higher average morale with non-state actors in the sample. Second, we 
similarly find that higher informal payments made in cash are associated with positive tax 
morale towards the district government, implying an increase of 25 percentage points or 50 
per cent the average tax morale. The positive relation of cash payments occurs with non-
governmental community actors as well, but with a smaller magnitude (columns 4-6-8). 
These positive spillover effects may indicate that taxpayers attribute outcomes from informal 
payments to the district government, whether or not they have a role in providing them (see 
e.g. Sacks 2012; van den Boogaard 2020).83 However, these positive attribution effects 
 
83 Relatedly, in Puntland Varming (2019: 17) finds that hybrid governance arrangements with religious authorities 
contributed to increased acceptance of, and compliance with, tax collection, with non-state actors contributing to ‘the 
constitution and (re)creation of the image of the self-reliant Puntland state’.  
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disappear for contributions made in labour (panel C, column 2), while labour contributions 
remain positively correlated with non-state community actors.  
Table 4 IRG and tax morale in relation to state and non-state actors 
 

















IRG 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.52 0.52 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.71 
R-sq. 0.014 0.104 0.007 0.018 0.009 0.043 0.015 0.053 
N 1224 1224 1259 1259 1258 1258 1232 1232 

















IRG 0.16*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.507 0.507 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.67 
R-sq. 0.000 0.134 0.022 0.043 0.028 0.084 0.041 0.119 
N 941 941 959 959 954 954 925 925 

















IRG -0.09** -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.07* 0.11*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Mean of Y 0.523 0.523 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 
R-sq. 0.005 0.119 0.006 0.022 0.008 0.050 0.003 0.065 
N 1,039 1,039 1,072 1,072 1,071 1,071 1,038 1,038 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All coefficients are OLS linear estimates. The 
dependent variable, the actor’s legitimacy, is defined as an indicator variable for the respondent somewhat or strongly agreeing 
with the fact that the actor always has the right to make people pay taxes. The main independent variable is an indicator 
variable for the respondent contributing more than the median in the sample: (i) in terms of types of payments in panel A, (ii) in 
terms of cash amounts in panel B, (iii) in terms of labour days in panel C. 
 
 
5.2 Informal taxes as an optimal response to information and enforcement 
problems? 
 
Second, Olken and Singhal (2011: 20) propose that informal taxation represents ‘the solution 
to a constrained optimal tax problem’, with governments less able than communities to 
enforce compliance and identify taxable incomes. In south-central Somalia, this certainly 
seems to be the case. The decentralised nature of public authority makes identifying taxable 
income possible through ‘observable but not legally verifiable’ means (Olken and Singhal 
2011: 21), facilitated by the small size of diya-paying groups. This is in line with growing 
evidence that in some contexts local elites are more capable of mobilising revenues than the 
state (see e.g. Balán, Bergeron, Tourek and Weigel 2020; van den Boogaard 2020).84 In the 
case of Gedo, however, this additional information does not necessarily reflect ‘the desire of 
communities to impose more redistributive (socially enforced) tax schedules than are feasible 
under formal taxation’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 26); as described in Section 4, while more 
vulnerable populations contribute less, informal payments are regressive among those that 
make any informal payments. 
 
 
84 These findings further align with broader research on the ways in which local leaders can improve governance 
outcomes and public service delivery in weak states (see e.g. Acemoglu, Cheema, Khwaja and Robinson 2020; Alatas, 
Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, Purnamasari and Wai-Poi 2019; Basurto, Dupas and Robinson 2020). 
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While community leaders are more effective at gathering information about taxpayers than 
the state, enforcement is likewise easier among non-state actors because of their legitimacy 
among community members. As described in Section 3, informal payments are embedded in 
local political, kin, and religious structures that facilitate compliance through social sanctions, 
with local leaders imbued with cultural and/or religious respect.85 Clan elders, for instance, 
are ‘the only group that possesses legitimacy across the broad spectrum of Somali society’ 
and ‘wield a moral authority that is associated with immediate recognition of legitimacy’ 
(Shire 2020: 2 and  14).86 Taxpayers largely have positive perceptions of the fairness of 
informal payments (Table 2), while, as described in Table 5, taxpayers have more positive 
perceptions of community leaders (village leaders, clan elders, and religious leaders) relative 
to the district government across measures of transparency, trust, performance, and 
authority to collect tax.87 As a village council member described, ‘Only religious and clan 
leaders collect payments with the support of the community members… this activity has 
been going on since time [im]memorial and will continue as long as the community 
continues.’88 Meanwhile, a focus group participant explained, ‘We trust clan and religious 
leaders because both of them enjoy considerable recognition from the community members. 
In this regard, they are the gatekeepers of the community in the absence of strong 
government and [their] institution[al] presence’.89  
  
 
85 Gundel (2006) explains that there is no common way for elders to be chosen, with some found by heritage, some 
chosen by a shir (council), and some emerging through respect and recognition. In some areas, individuals may be 
more willing to comply with clan-based decisions, given the often decentralised ways in which community decisions are 
taken. Clan governance does not normally follow a hierarchical pattern of authority; as Lewis (2002: 10) describes, ‘a 
hierarchical pattern of authority is foreign to Somali nomadic pastoral society which in its customary process of decision-
making is democratic almost to the point of anarchy’ – though, notably, excluding women (Hudson 2015). While clans 
are traditionally led by Sultans (Suldan, Boqar, Garad, Uqas, etc.), power is not normally vested in a single leader. 
Lewis (2002: 10) notes that Sultans ‘are normally little more than convenient figureheads and lack any firmly 
institutionalized power… [their] effective power is often no greater, and sometimes less, than that of other clan elders’. 
Technically all adult males are ‘classed as elders (oday, pl. odayaal) with the right to speak at the council (shir) which 
deliberates matters of common concern’ (Lewis 1998a: 196). Within a diya-paying shir, ‘All men are councillors, and all 
men are politicians’ (Lewis 1998a: 198). In practice, Lewis (1998a: 5) notes that clans are ‘often led by a clan-head’, 
though remain ‘without centralised administration or government’. Though there is no ‘stable hierarchy’ among clan 
structures (Lewis 1998a: 196), ‘influence and power [is] conferred by the society according to specific standards of 
virtue’, limited to males (Mohamed 2007: 227; see also Lewis 1998a: 196, 198). Some note that recent political 
statebuilding processes have shifted the incentives of clan leaders, who are perceived by some to be growing less 
legitimate and accountable due to the manner of their integration with formal state structures (see e.g. Hoehne 2010, 
2011; Hussein 2018). It should moreover be noted that in some parts of the country, the structure and selection of 
traditional leaders was manipulated by colonial administrators, who, to attempt to facilitate indirect rule, created ‘artificial 
positions of leadership’ that had no traditional roots (Lewis 1998a: 203), though have since become ‘traditional’ 
(Mohamed 2007). 
86 Tazebew and Kefale (2021), for example, describe that ‘elders are highly-esteemed in their locality’ and enable a means 
of economic regulation and enforcement ‘[u]nderwritten in mutual trust, kinship and patron-client relations’. 
87 Similar patterns are found in the perceptions of individuals in the vulnerable population, with data found in Appendix 7.  
88 Interview, village council member, Hirshabelle state, 2016. 
89 FGD participant, Hirshabelle state, 2016.  
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Table 5 Taxpayer perceptions of state and non-state actors (0-1 indicators, general 
population of taxpayers) 
 
Variable  N  Mean 
High transparency – district 1258 0.20 
High transparency – village council 1262 0.42 
High transparency – clan elders 1259 0.40 
High transparency – religious leaders 1258 0.20 
High trust – district 1249 0.64 
High trust – village council 1284 0.95 
High trust – clan elders 1287 0.92 
High trust – religious leaders 1230 0.88 
Better performance – district 1171 0.46 
Better performance – village council 1272 0.71 
Better performance – clan elders 1277 0.61 
Better performance – religious leaders 1206 0.59 
High tax morale – district 1240 0.53 
High tax morale – village council 1275 0.76 
High tax morale – clan elders 1273 0.73 
High tax morale – religious leaders 1241 0.71 
 
At the same time, clan elders have considerable influence to enforce diya and other 
payments, with their power stemming from their moral authority and with enforcement 
depending largely on societal norms, supported by clan or community pressure and a desire 
to earn social capital and respect, avoid public shaming, ostracism or the denial of access to 
the clan’s safety net and benefits, as well as the material, physical or moral punishments that 
the xeer beegti (clan leaders entrusted with applying customary law) may apply to persons 
who ignore their ruling (PDRC 2003: 147–150). As Lewis (1998b: 50) notes, ‘Ultimately, force 
or its threat [is] the final sanction supporting a settlement.’ Strong enforcement capacity also 
reflects a broader culture of obeying decisions taken by elders and religious leaders – as the 
Somali saying goes, ‘He who rejects right judgment does not believe in Almighty God either’ 
(Gar diid waa Alla diid) (PDRC 2003: 28, 150).90 As described by a citizen in Jubbaland, ‘The 
payments collected by the elders, it is not a question [to pay them or not], for they explain the 
reason and they demonstrate the result’,91 while another taxpayer explained, ‘If you try to 
reject their collection, elders will remove you from the clan insurance and you will have no 
support.’92 Accordingly, local enforcement capacity is underpinned not just by the legitimacy 
of local actors, but through the considerable social pressures and informal sanctions that 
create a de facto obligation to contribute.  
Strong local enforcement capacity contrasts sharply with anecdotal evidence of the capacity 
of the state to collect taxes. As described in Section 2, local taxes are often collected by 
force, unsurprisingly contributing to low taxpayer perceptions of their fairness and reciprocity. 
For instance, Nenova (2004: 2) describes that state taxes are ‘perceived as pay-off to avoid 
harassment, rather than payments in exchange for public goods provision’, while Varming 
(2019) describes how citizens in Puntland are more likely to comply with requests for 
contributions from government when religious authority figures are involved, as a result of 
‘increased trust and the hope of proper management of the collected funds’.93 Underpinning 
 
90 Tellingly, a decision made by the elders guurti (the governing body of the family, clan or community comprising the 
elders from every social unit of the participating lineages or community of lineages), is known as guurti ka hadh  – a 
decision no one can deny (Gundel 2006: 15). 
91 Interview, taxpayer, Jubbaland, 2016.  
92 Interview, taxpayer, Jubbaland, 2016.  
93 As she describes, ‘the involvement of the sheikhs was a prerequisite for many business owners to pay the extra 
contribution [for emergency relief]. In response to a question of whether the money collected from the business 
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these perspectives, Abshir, Abdirahman, and Stogdon (2020: 2) note that formal taxes are 
known as canshuur, meaning a restriction or burden, which ‘signif[ies] a system imposed and 
regulated by force’. It is particularly telling that taxpayers prefer to travel through al-
Shabaab’s transport and customs checkpoints rather than the state’s, as the former are seen 
as more accountable and fairer (in relative terms) (Hiraal Institute 2020a, United Nations 
Security Council 2018: para. 86, see also Marchal 2018: 354–355).94 This is in line with the 
suggestion that where governments are perceived to be corrupt, citizens ‘may prefer to make 
payments toward public projects in a form that cannot be expropriated’ (Olken and Singhal 
2011: 25), as well as the recognition that ‘local acceptance of taxation is not dependent on 
the formal status of the tax’ (Varming 2019: 5).  
 
While it may thus be more ‘optimal’ for decentralised actors to levy taxes in this context, 
there is an important need to move away from the tendency towards a statist bias and 
assumptions that the prevalence of informal revenue generation is in some way a ‘choice’ by 
the state. For example, Olken and Singhal (2011: 20–21) suggest that ‘local governments 
wish to finance public goods in a social welfare maximizing way and are making a choice 
between formal and informal taxation’. In south-central Somalia, rather than explaining how 
or why things ‘work’ outside of the state, it may be more relevant and useful to consider 
decentralised public authority as the default referent, with a need only to explain the puzzle 
of ‘pockets of state effectiveness’. Barring the powerful centralised sultanates of the early 
and middle ages, pastoral zones have not come under effective control of a state in the 
modern period. State collapse is often assumed to lead to greater informal taxation and 
governance, though in south-central Somalia, ‘the collapse of the state [was] not as traumatic 
for nomadic populations as outsiders often presume’ (Menkhaus 2006: 87).95 Effectively, 
communities operate largely outside of the state, as they have long been doing.  
 
5.3 Informal taxes as user fees? 
 
Third, Olken and Singhal (2011: 22) propose that informal tax ‘payments represent pre-paid 
user fees or benefits taxes’. While this is certainly the case for some informal payments, 
including those made to teachers or schools in order to access education, this hypothesis 
does not fit with many of the common informal taxes and contributions paid in Gedo region, 
where our survey evidence shows that taxpayers expect little in return for the informal 
payments and contributions that they make (Table 2).96 This is in line with the description of 
informal payments in Section 3, which makes clear that many of these payments are 
required or requested to fulfil collective responsibilities rather than to provide direct access to 
a good. Research participants likewise made clear that many of these payments are 
‘necessary’ insofar as they are necessary to maintain good standing within the community 
and thus to be eligible to receive reciprocal support from the community in the future. In this 
context, informal payments reflect collective financing of public goods, without being 
immediately requited. Illustrating these more embedded ties of reciprocity, access to forms of 
informal social welfare seems to be associated with informal tax payment. While the sample 
of vulnerable individuals are less likely than the general population to make informal 
payments, as described in Section 4, they are also less likely to receive access to various 
 
community was paid directly to the government, the owner of a large business responded, “Oh no! No one would pay 
them directly (Laughing)”’ (Varming 2019: 13).  
94 The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Ethiopia describes al-Shabaab’s tax system as ‘accountable and predictable’ 
as a result of the issuance of receipts, while acknowledging that the authority is responsive to taxpayers – for instance, 
quickly responding to businesses’ complaints about double taxation or fraudulent tax collectors (United Nations Security 
Council 2018: 86). In these regards, the organisational competence of al-Shabaab sharply contrasts to the formal tax 
system, which lacks oversight and accountability, with some taxpayers actually preferring al-Shabaab’s tax system to 
the federal or regional system (United Nations Security Council 2018: 86). 
95 From the perspective of informal taxation, the state collapse may nevertheless be relevant insofar as it has led to an 
important role of NGOs in co-financing public goods with communities.   
96 As noted above, however, user fees to private actors are common in the region, given that it is primarily private 
companies that provide key services like water, electricity, and schooling. 
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forms of assistance (see Table 1). Moreover, Table 6 shows that among both the general 
and vulnerable populations, those that make at least one informal payment are significantly 
more likely to receive access to informal social assistance, regardless of who provides it.97  
Table 6 Assistance received by whether at least one payment is made 




5.4 Informal taxes as altruistic voluntary contributions? 
 
Fourth, Olken and Singhal (2011: 23) suggest that informal taxes may be ‘more akin to 
voluntary charitable contributions than taxes’. While research participants and key informants 
often described a blurred line between the voluntary and mandatory nature of informal 
payments, our survey evidence makes clear that the majority of taxpayers view non-
compliance with informal payments as resulting in punishment (Table 2). Notably, taxpayers 
perceived it more likely to be punished for non-payment of informal payments, than of the 
formal livestock tax, for which only 42 per cent of taxpayers reported that non-payment was 
very or somewhat likely to result in punishment.98 While, as described in Section 3, some 
informal payments are grounded in customary law (xeer) and thus have considerable force, 
the importance of social pressures and sanctions is also relevant to understanding what are 
often perceived as mandatory payments. This is illustrated by the Somali proverb ‘Gar diid 
waa Alla diid’, meaning a disobedient person – one who doesn’t respect what has been 
agreed upon – is fined; if he again disobeys, he is alienated from the society or clan 
insurance (Gundel 2006: iv). With this perceived threat of punishment and social sanction, 
we thus find, consistent with Olken and Singhal (2011: 23) that informal tax payments ‘are 
unlikely to be motivated solely by altruism or warm glow preferences’.  
 
 
97 In the questionnaire, we further asked whether the assistance was provided by a relative, village or community 
association, someone from another village, government, an armed group, a political party, a religious entity, an NGO or 
welfare group, an insurance group, or another actor.  
98 As livestock tax is the only formal tax paid by more than 10 per cent of the sample (see Section 2), it is the only formal 
tax with a large enough sample to allow for comparison.  
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6  Conclusions 
 
Our exploration of informal taxation and revenue generation in an understudied context 
clearly shows that informal taxes are critical to local public goods finance in contexts of weak 
formal taxation. In Somalia, as in other low-income and fragile contexts, the full landscape of 
institutions for providing security, governance and public goods provision is often ‘virtually 
invisible to external observers, whose sole preoccupation is often with the one structure that 
actually provides the least amount of rule of law to Somalis – the central state’ (Menkhaus, 
2006: 87). Our research makes clear that informal tax institutions need to be incorporated 
within analyses of taxation, service delivery, social protection, and equity. As described by 
Olken and Singhal, ‘Failing to take informal taxation into account will lead to underestimates 
of the tax burden faced by households, the size of the public sector, and the level of 
decentralisation’, as well as leading to an overestimation of ‘the overall progressivity of the 
tax system’ (Olken and Singhal 2011: 19, 26).  
 
Our evidence provides support for several non-mutually exclusive theories for the prevalence 
of informal taxation. First, given weak formal tax capacity, informal taxation and revenue 
generation fills gaps left by the state and provides essential public goods. Our evidence 
further suggests, however, that sub-national governments actually benefit from informal 
revenue generation and the outcomes it enables, with informal revenue generation positively 
correlated with formal tax morale. Second, in line with expectations, informal taxes represent 
a solution to the information and enforcement challenges faced by the state. Local leaders 
that are engaged in informal revenue generation have greater information about taxpayers, 
while their enforcement is backed by significant local legitimacy and ability to levy sanctions 
in the case of non-payment. 
 
At the same time, however, our evidence disproves the relevance of other theories of 
informal taxation in the context of Gedo region. First, while some informal taxes are 
effectively user fees for public services received, our evidence shows that taxpayers in Gedo 
expect little in return for the payments they make. Instead, many of the payments made 
represent informal payments to fill collective responsibilities of governance and financing 
public goods provision. Second, rather than being voluntary, the majority of taxpayers expect 
punishment as a result of non-payment, with social sanctions and ostracism from communal 
support and governance being particularly effective deterrents from evasion. 
 
Our research contributes to what is a limited but growing body of knowledge on informal 
taxation, while at the same time raising additional questions for future research. First, though 
this deep look at the nature of informal revenue generation in Gedo region provides an 
important contribution of empirical evidence and contextual depth, future research should 
explore how the patterns and dynamics of informal revenue raising vary across different 
regions and the diverse clan networks in south-central Somalia. In particular, it would be 
valuable for further analysis to explore the dynamics of informal revenue generation in a 
context not dominated by a single clan. To what extent is the prevalence of informal taxation 
seen in Gedo region reflective of the relatively homogenous population and structures of 
public authority?  
 
Second, given the extreme nature of the case in south-central Somalia, further research is 
required to explore the way in which the prevalence, incidence, and structures of informal 
revenue generation are linked to conflict, fragility, and state weakness. As discussed, in 
many ways, informal revenue generation in Gedo substitutes for the lack of formal state 
taxation, while it is thus reasonable to consider that its prevalence, incidence, nature, and 
structure may vary in contexts where formal and informal taxation operate in parallel. Indeed, 
research on informal taxation and revenue generation in Sierra Leone appears to document 
greater variation in the relationships between informal revenue generation and the state, with 
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the state’s relative coexistence, competition, or collusion with informal taxing actors being 
shaped by its dependence on them to govern (van den Boogaard 2020). Future research 
could valuably deepen our understanding of this variation by engaging in structured 
comparisons and explorations in contexts with stronger state institutions.   
 
Finally, our findings point to the ways in which informal revenue generation may complement 
or even strengthen local government taxation. More research is needed in order to 
understand the mechanisms underpinning this association and to further consider how this 
varies across cash and labour contributions. We are taking first steps to explore these 
dynamics through an ongoing study of the impacts of matching grants on community-based 
contributions and perceptions of government in Gedo region. In particular, it will be valuable 
to explore the relationship between informal taxation and state legitimacy, which may have 
important implications for sub-national governance in weak and fragile contexts. To what 
extent do citizens attribute informal taxes to local or national governing authorities? What are 
the implications for the ways in which local governments may work with local communities to 
either raise revenues or provide services through hybrid models of governance? How may 
the relationship between informal revenue generation, the state, and formal tax morale vary 
in contexts that are more or less supportive of broader federal statebuilding processes? 
 
Our research in south-central Somalia reinforces the importance of informal revenue 
generation to public goods provision in weak formal institutional contexts, to everyday 
citizens, and to policymakers attempting to extend the influence of the federal state in the 
region. At the same time, our work raises significant new questions and thus gives further 
motivation for exploring the dynamics and impacts of informal taxation and revenue 







Appendix 1 Map of Jubbaland state and Gedo region99 
 
Source: Adapted from Menkhaus (2004d). 
  
 
99 Outlined in red. 
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Appendix 2 Settlement-level data 
 
     N   Mean   St. dev   p25   Median   p75 
Village characteristics       
Rural village 117 .97 0.16 1 1 1 
Population 117 1426.4 5686.4 240 476 900 
Darod Marehan as dominant clan 117 .8 .4 1 1 1 
Agriculture 115 48.2 26.4 30 50 70 
Fishing 94 2.3 6.3 0 0 0 
Breeding 108 34.6 28 5 37.5 60 
Small business/petty trading 98 5.7 12.9 0 0 5 
# public meetings last year 116 8 10.4 2 3 10 
Attendance at last public meeting 97 899.1 5450.1 35 50 150 
Has a public notice board visible 117 .1 .3 0 0 0 
Village leader characteristic 
      
Male village leader 117 .96 .20 1 1 1 
Village leader tenure (years) 117 6.8 5.7 4 5 8 
       
Public services       
Has a primary school 117 .44 .50 0 0 1 
Has paved road 117 .17 .37 0 0 0 
Has piped water 117 .05 .22 0 0 0 
Has communal water source 117 .25 .43 0 0 0 
Has electricity 117 .02 .13 0 0 0 
Has a public hospital/clinic  117 .07 .25 0 0 0 
Has garbage collection 117 .14 .35 0 0 0 
Has a public market 117 .07 .25 0 0 0 
Has public transport 117 .03 .18 0 0 0 
 
Appendix 3 Clan distribution in Jubbaland state100 
 
Source: UN Habitat (2018). 
 
100 Outlined in red. 
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Appendix 4 Al-Shabaab presence in Jubbaland state 
 
Data source UN Habitat (2018). 
 
Appendix 5 Number of conflict events per year by district in Gedo region, 
2010–2020101 
 




101  Conflict events include, as classified by ACLED, battles, explosions/remote violence, riots, and violence against 
civilians. Data was not found for Buurdhuubo district.  
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 Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
High transparency – district 1029 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
High transparency – village council 1028 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
High transparency – clan elders 1024 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
High transparency – religious leader 1029 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
High trust – district 993 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
High trust – village council 1028 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 
High trust – clan elders 1028 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
High trust – religious leaders 1013 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Better performance – district 859 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Better performance – village council 1014 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Better performance – clan elders 999 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Better performance – religious leader 991 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
High tax morale – district 956 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
High tax morale – village council 1025 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 
High tax morale – clan elders 1024 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00 
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